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Vertical Boilerplate
James Gibson*
Abstract
Despite what we learn in law school about the “meeting of the
minds,” most contracts are merely boilerplate—take-it-or-leave-it
propositions. Negotiation is nonexistent; we rely on our collective
market power as consumers to regulate contracts’ content. But
boilerplate imposes certain information costs because it often
arrives late in the transaction and is hard to understand. If those
costs get too high, then the market mechanism fails.
So how high are boilerplate’s information costs? A few studies
have attempted to measure them, but they all use a “horizontal”
approach—i.e., they sample a single stratum of boilerplate and
assume that it represents the whole transaction. Yet real-world
transactions often involve multiple layers of contracts, each with
its own information costs. What is needed, then, is a “vertical”
analysis, a study that examines fewer contracts of any one kind
but tracks all the contracts the consumer encounters, soup to nuts.
This Article presents the first vertical study of boilerplate. It
casts serious doubt on the market mechanism and shows that
existing scholarship fails to appreciate the full scale of the
information cost problem. It then offers two regulatory solutions.
The first works within contract law’s unconscionability doctrine,
tweaking what the parties need to prove and who bears the burden
of proving it. The second, more radical solution involves forcing
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both sellers and consumers to confront and minimize boilerplate’s
information costs—an approach I call “forced salience.” In the
end, the boilerplate experience is as deep as it is wide. Our
empirical work should reflect that fact, and our policy proposals
should too.
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I. Introduction
Forget what your contracts professor told you about offers,
counteroffers, and meetings of the minds. Most contracts are
merely boilerplate—i.e., take-it-or-leave-it propositions. In
theory, that’s fine because the same is true of most market
transactions. We negotiate over almost nothing. No one haggles
with a supermarket cashier over the price of a loaf of bread, or
how thinly it is sliced, or whether it’s covered by a warranty.
Instead, we rely on our collective power as consumers to drive
unwanted terms (contractual or otherwise) out of the
marketplace. Competition, not negotiation, is the answer.
Scholars have observed for some time, however, that when it
comes to boilerplate contracts, market competition may not work
as well as theory would have us believe.1 Boilerplate, these
observers maintain, is particularly resistant to market forces
because of the high information costs it imposes on consumers: it
often arrives late in the transaction, and once it arrives it often
consists of overlong, impenetrable gobbledygook. This means that
consumers routinely disregard boilerplate in their purchasing
decisions, which in turn means that the market cannot be trusted
to regulate it.2
Recent empirical evidence supports this view. But the studies
so far have all been “horizontal”—they examine a single stratum
of boilerplate (e.g., an array of software licensing agreements)
and assume that it represents the whole transaction. Such
studies are certainly useful in that they reveal some of the
information costs that boilerplate creates for consumers. But they
capture only a single moment in time, one aspect of the overall
1. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the
Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 240–48 (1995); Robert A. Hillman,
Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms
Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 840–45 (2006); Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1203, 1217–44 (2003); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1225–27 (1983).
2. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law
and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 601 (1990) (“[T]here
generally will be too few informed consumers to produce a competitive market
for contract terms.”).

164

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (2013)

consumer experience. A more realistic approach would recognize
that a consumer’s ability to evaluate boilerplate is a function of
the information costs of the entire purchase, soup to nuts. What
is missing, then, is a “vertical” analysis—a study that examines
fewer contracts of any one kind, but places the consumer’s
encounter with those contracts in a more representative, realworld context, in which the boilerplate represents part of the
transaction rather than its entirety. In short, a horizontal study
is a still life, whereas a vertical study is a film—a moving picture
of the consumer’s entire transaction.
This Article presents the results of the first-ever vertical
study of boilerplate. The subject of the study, like the subject of
the emerging empirics and the foundational case law in the field,
is the computer industry. To gauge overall information costs, I
purchased ordinary desktop computers from four major vendors,
tallied every word of boilerplate to which I became contractually
bound, and recorded the point in the transactions at which each
term arrived. The result? An average of twenty-five different
contracts, comprising almost as many words as a Harry Potter
novel. And nine out of every ten of those boilerplate terms arrived
late in the transaction, long after the seller had been paid.
This study casts doubt on the law’s current approach to
boilerplate terms, which is to enforce them whenever minimal
disclosure and assent requirements have been satisfied.3 And
when the study’s results are situated in the current scholarship,
they show that even those who doubt the market’s efficacy fail to
appreciate the full scale of the information cost problem. In the
end, these observations lead me to offer two regulatory solutions.
The first and more conventional consists of tweaks to the
unconscionability doctrine—modest changes in what the parties
need to prove under the doctrine and who bears the burden of
proving it. The second, more radical solution involves forcing both
sellers and consumers to confront and minimize the information

3. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1204 (“If the non-drafting party indicates
his general assent to the form, courts will enforce the terms contained therein
whether or not that party approves of the terms provided, understands those
terms, has read them, or even has the vaguest idea what the terms might be
about.”).
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costs that boilerplate creates—an approach I call “forced
salience.”
Two clarifications before we continue. First, as the discussion
so far implies, I use the term “boilerplate” to mean any written
contract drafted by one party and not subject to revision by the
other (what others variously call form contracts or contracts of
adhesion).4 For my purposes, then, it does not matter whether
boilerplate terms are the same across a given industry or whether
they vary from seller to seller. As long as a seller’s contract is a
take-it-or-leave-it proposition, it falls within my definition.
Second, this Article examines information costs and their
effect on the market from the point of view of the individual
consumer—“bottom up,” so to speak. It therefore does not make
“top down,” legislative-style judgments about what particular
terms are bad for consumers as a class and should therefore be
forbidden by fiat. Such judgments have their place, but this is an
Article about boilerplate, not about arbitration clauses or class
action waivers or hidden credit card fees (important though those
topics are). Indeed, as we will see, even boilerplate that goes
unread can contain provisions that benefit both parties, and it is
not the province of the law to forbid such terms, even if they
emerge from an impaired market.5
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes the
current debate between those who believe that the market for
boilerplate functions reasonably well and those who don’t, and it
discusses emerging empirical evidence on the issue. Part III adds
a new dimension to those empirics by presenting the results of
my vertical study and demonstrating the overwhelming
information costs that a real-world transaction imposes on
consumers. Part IV uses this real-world perspective to review and
reject two common defenses of boilerplate’s enforceability.
Finally, Part V details my approach to regulating boilerplate in a
world of vertical transactions. Take it or leave it.

4. See Rakoff supra note 1, at 1177 (listing characteristics of a “contract of
adhesion”).
5. See infra Part V.A (discussing boilerplate as an example of the classic
market for lemons).
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II. The State of the Debate

To understand why boilerplate’s information costs are
important, one must first understand how consumers and
boilerplate interact in the marketplace. I therefore begin by
defining a core issue on which almost everyone agrees—namely,
that the enforceability of boilerplate depends on how well the
relevant market is functioning. I then describe how consumers’
information costs can threaten that market function. This will set
the stage for Part III’s vertical study of boilerplate’s real-world
information costs.
A. The Common Ground: Contracts as Product Features
Anyone who has taken (or taught) Contracts in law school is
familiar with the typical reaction when the topic turns to
contracts of adhesion. By that point in the semester, students
have learned to think of a contract as a negotiated arrangement
of parties’ personal preferences—a meeting of the minds,
mediated by the give-and-take of offer and counteroffer. Then,
suddenly, they encounter boilerplate and its adhesive terms, and
they realize that in real life the vast majority of contracts are
take-it-or-leave-it propositions. No negotiation takes place. No
minds meet. One party gives; one party takes. Madness!
If the market is functioning properly, however, these
objections are unavailing. Nonnegotiable terms are the norm in
the modern marketplace. Price is a prime example: consumers
don’t usually negotiate over the price of the products they buy.
Rather, price tends to be a take-it-or-leave-it term, and we trust
that competition will punish those sellers that set theirs too
high.6 Likewise, if a consumer desires a product feature that one
6. “Seller” is my shorthand for the party that introduces the boilerplate
into the transaction. Obviously there are circumstances in which the buyer
originates the contract, but this Article focuses on consumers, who will usually
be buyers and will usually be contract “takers” rather than contract “givers.” In
a similar vein, this Article limits its scope to consumers and the market failure
that attends their contractual transactions. But it may well be the case that the
market is no more adept at responding to the contractual preferences of
sophisticated business entities than those of consumers. Many of the adhesion
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seller does not provide (say, a sunroof on a rental car),7 the
answer is not negotiation; the answer is that the consumer takes
his or her business elsewhere—namely, to a competing seller that
does offer that feature.
Instead of relying on the individual power of negotiation,
then, we rely on the collective power of competition to provide
consumers with the array of product features they desire, at a
price they are willing to pay. Why shouldn’t we approach
boilerplate the same way?8 Let the market punish those sellers
whose contracts are too onerous. Consumers will express their
contracts that I encountered in my study would have applied equally to
businesses or had a separate but equally complex contractual counterpart for
such purchasers. And Mitu Gulati and Robert Scott have recently shown that
even in the sovereign-debt market, where multibillion-dollar banks and hedge
funds transact with nation-states, boilerplate language fails to respond to the
parties’ clear preferences—a phenomenon that Gulati and Scott blame on a
suspect familiar to this Article’s readers, namely “a business model that relies
on herd behavior, fails to provide incentives for innovation and thus rises and
falls on volume-based, cookie-cutter transactions.” G. Mitu Gulati & Robert E.
Scott, Introduction: The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate and
the Limits of Contract Design 8 (Columbia Univ. Law Sch., Working Paper No.
410, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1945988; see also Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form
Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 677, 680 (2007) [hereinafter Marotta-Wurgler, Empirical Analysis]
(finding that “[end-user license agreements] associated with products targeted
toward the general public are not significantly more pro-seller than the [enduser license agreements] associated with business-oriented products”).
7. For some reason, cars (with and without sunroofs) tend to be the
example of choice when discussing market responses to consumer preferences.
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS.
L. REV. 679, 688 (using the example of a red sports car with a sunroof and
standard transmission); Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1220 (using the example of
different colored cars, each with different options available).
8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 144 (8th ed.
2011) (“[W]hat is important is not whether there is haggling in every
transaction but whether competition forces sellers to incorporate in their
standard contracts terms that protect the purchasers.”); Robert A. Hillman &
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 442 (2002) (“[T]he aggregate decisions of many consumers
can pressure businesses into providing an efficient set of contract terms in their
standard forms.”); Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1209 (describing “the market
discipline established by the ability of buyers to shop among sellers for the most
desirable package of product attributes, including contract terms”); Rakoff,
supra note 1, at 1251 (“[B]argaining is not essential . . . as long as shopping
concerning the particular term takes place.”).
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preferences by rejecting those terms in favor of more attractive
terms offered by another seller. Unwanted boilerplate will simply
disappear from the market, just as ridiculously high prices do.9
In other words, a boilerplate term is merely a product
feature—no different from price or a sunroof. The law would not
normally regulate the price that a car rental company charges its
customers or force it to offer sunroofs in its vehicles. For the same
reason, the argument goes, the law should enforce a boilerplate
contract without regard to its content. Let the market work it out.
This notion of boilerplate as a product feature, regulated by
market forces, has become a staple of both the scholarly
literature and the case law. Scholars consistently equate contract
terms to noncontractual attributes of a product.10 And perhaps
the most well-known case on boilerplate, ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg,11 wholeheartedly embraced this idea in discussing
the adhesive “terms of use” that the seller had included with its
digital database software:
Terms of use are no less a part of “the product” than are the
size of the database and the speed with which the software
9. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1219 (explaining that the standard
economic model assumes that consumers engage in a cost–benefit analysis of
products before they buy and that such behavior drives out of the market all
products with undesirable attributes or with production costs that are higher
than buyers are willing to pay).
10. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV.
933, 933 (2006) (equating adhesion contracts to computer screens,
microprocessors, and battery power); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the
Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 214 (“There is no reason to
distinguish contract terms from any other aspect of a product’s composition.”);
David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 281 n.7 (1986) (“A contract can be
regarded as another product attribute . . . .”); Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as
Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 147 (1970) (characterizing adhesion contracts as
just one part of “a unitary, purchased bundle”); Margaret Jane Radin,
Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1223, 1229 (2006) (noting the widespread assumption among symposium
participants regarding “the collapse of any distinction between the product . . .
on the one hand, and the contract . . . on the other”); Alan Schwartz & Louis L.
Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 671 (1979) (characterizing
contract terms as “another product feature” and comparing them to “color
varieties”).
11. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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compiles listings. Competition among vendors, not judicial
revision of a package’s contents, is how consumers are
protected in a market economy. . . . ProCD has rivals, which
may elect to compete by offering superior software, monthly
updates, improved terms of use, lower price, or a better
compromise among these elements.12

This widespread acceptance of boilerplate as just another
product feature approach has occasioned a shift in the scholarly
literature. Scholars no longer worry about individual negotiation;
instead, they worry about whether ProCD’s assertion is correct:
does competition among sellers over the terms of contracts
adequately protect consumer interests? We turn to that question
next.
B. The Battleground: Market Function or Market Failure
We have now seen that contract law and scholarship treat
boilerplate as simply another product feature, which consumers
are free to accept or reject according to their own preferences.
Under this view, a functioning market will regulate the content of
adhesive contracts just as it regulates other features, such as
price. Enforceability of boilerplate accordingly depends on how
well the market responds to consumer preferences regarding that
“feature” of the transaction—the boilerplate’s terms.
To evaluate the market’s responsiveness to the boilerplate
“feature,” however, one must first understand how the market
regulates the features of a product as a general matter. In an
ideal world, a consumer identifies and evaluates all the features
of a product, rating each against the others in an internal cost–
benefit calculus that reflects his or her particular preferences. So
when evaluating a car rental, I decide how much each of the
many product features matters to me, regardless of whether that
feature is contractual in nature (e.g., mileage allotment,
insurance coverage) or noncontractual (e.g., the model of the car,

12.

Id. at 1453 (citation omitted).
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its color, whether it has a sunroof).13 I then perform the same
evaluation on the competing car rentals that the market offers.
When I have evaluated all the rental offerings, I choose the
one that most closely approaches my optimal balance of features,
so as to maximize the utility I derive from the transaction—or I
exit the market entirely, having failed to identify any option that
justifies the price that the seller demands.14 Either choice sends a
signal to the marketplace about what features I desire and how
much I am willing to pay for them, and that signal is combined
with the signals from other consumers to produce an efficient
array of market options.15
This
idealized
model,
known
as
“compensatory”
decisionmaking,16 makes many assumptions about consumer
behavior. Most important, it assumes that consumers are capable
of both acquiring the information they need and then processing
that information in a sophisticated cost–benefit analysis, under
which the merits of unrelated features like sunroofs and
insurance policies are reduced to some common utility metric
(price, presumably) by which they can be compared and traded off
13. In a sense, of course, the latter features could also be considered
contractual, in that the rental agency promises to provide a car with those
features. But the “contractual” label here is meant to capture the more abstract,
intangible kinds of promises, which are often found in boilerplate.
14. Shoshana Shiloh et al., Individual Differences in Compensatory
Decision-Making Style and Need for Closure as Correlates of Subjective Decision
Complexity and Difficulty, 30 PERSONALITY & INDIV. DIFFS. 699, 701 (2001) (“A
compensatory strategy entails that the alternative chosen is superior to the
other alternatives in the sum of the weighted utilities of all the attributes
considered, and leads to maximization of utilities—the main criterion of
normative decision making.”). For a more detailed (and quite excellent)
explanation of this idealized process in a contracts context, see Korobkin, supra
note 1, at 1219–22.
15. See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The
Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 635, 638 (1996) (explaining that in an ideal world with perfect
information, contracts “will contain only efficient terms . . . because all of the
terms will, by definition, be fully understood and properly valued”).
16. See Shiloh et al., supra note 14, at 701 (explaining that “compensatory”
decisionmaking means that “the decision maker clarifies objectives, surveys an
array of alternatives, searches for relevant information, assimilates information
in an unbiased manner, and evaluates alternatives carefully before making a
choice”).
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against one another.17 As discussed below, both assumptions are
suspect.
1. Information Acquisition
The first flaw in the idealized model of compensatory
decisionmaking is that it assumes that consumers can efficiently
acquire the necessary information about the options the market
offers.
Suppose I want to rent a car with two particular features: I
want it to be reliable and I want it to have a sunroof. It is
relatively easy to distinguish cars that have sunroofs from those
that do not. It might be harder to determine whether a car is
reliable. And if the cost of acquiring information about reliability
exceeds the value I attach to that feature, I will make my decision
without regard to reliability.18 It is rational for me to do so, given
the cost of information acquisition, but my choice nevertheless
sends the wrong signal to the marketplace because the
information acquisition cost prevented me from expressing my
preference with regard to reliability.
If we view a boilerplate contract as just another product
feature, then the information acquisition problem requires us to
examine how difficult it is for consumers to learn the terms of the
contract and make compensatory judgments accordingly.
Contract law has several mechanisms that address this issue,
such as the requirement that terms be reasonably certain before
a contract is formed,19 the distinction between an acceptance and
a counteroffer,20 and limitations on the modification of contracts
after formation.21 In various ways, these mechanisms mediate the
tension between the need to arrive at a meaningful agreement
17. Grether et al., supra note 10, at 287 (“Consumers could fail to choose
the best because of high costs of acquiring information about market choices . . .
or because of high costs of processing information about market choices . . . .”).
18. See id. at 287–88 (explaining that “even rational consumers fail to
consider all options in the face of high information costs”).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981).
20. Id. § 59.
21. Id. § 89.
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and the fact that all contracts are incomplete—i.e., that some
contractual terms are unknown or become known only after the
parties are heavily invested in the transaction.22
Despite these existing doctrinal mechanisms, there is
compelling evidence that current contract law does not
adequately address consumers’ information acquisition costs,
such that consumers often cannot engage in compensatory
decisionmaking with regard to the boilerplate terms that
accompany many common transactions. Indeed, the significance
of those costs has been one of the most hotly contested topics in
contract case law and scholarship over the last fifteen years.23
On one side of the debate are those who have no objection to
delaying the availability of boilerplate terms until other aspects
of the transaction are well underway. The best example of this
approach is, again, Judge Easterbrook’s famous ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg,24 which stands for the proposition that contractual
terms withheld from a consumer until late in the transaction are
nevertheless enforceable, as long as the consumer had a chance to
return the product if the terms were not acceptable.25 After all,
the argument goes, consumers know that modern transactions
often come with boilerplate attached.26 Some courts have followed
ProCD, and some scholars have defended it.27
In other quarters, however, ProCD’s belief in a functioning
market has not been as well received. The main objection is that
even if the late-arriving boilerplate gives consumers the option to
22. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 299–
301 (2004) (discussing incomplete contracts).
23. See sources cited infra notes 24–29.
24. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
25. Id. at 1452.
26. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149–50 (7th Cir.
1997) (Easterbrook, J.) (following ProCD and noting that late-arriving
boilerplate contains terms that consumers value as part of the transaction).
27. For courts, see, e.g., id. at 1148–49; Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v.
Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2006); i.Lan Sys., Inc.
v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002). For
scholars, see, e.g., Eric A. Posner, ProCD v Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload
in Contractual Bargaining, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1194 (2010) (“[ProCD] will
be remembered as a masterpiece of realist judging, one of the great opinions in
the canon of contract law cases.”).
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reject its terms, by that point they have invested too much time
and attention to return the product (i.e., reject the “offer”) and go
back to square one. For example, in ProCD’s world, consumers
who want to comparison-shop for personal computers must
purchase a computer, bring it home, and search it for boilerplate
(both within its box and once it is started up)—and then must
repeat this process for each and every computer they are
considering.28 This imposes arguably insuperable information
acquisition costs, and, for this reason, many commentators and
several courts have rejected ProCD and argued against the
enforceability of late-arriving boilerplate.29
As we will see below, a common response to the problem of
information acquisition costs is to require the disclosure of
28. Cf. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (relying on ProCD to enforce contractual
terms found in the box of a mail-order computer).
29. For courts, see, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332,
1339–41 (D. Kan. 2000) (discussing why the court was not persuaded to follow
the reasoning used in Hill and ProCD); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc.,
25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230–31, 1230 n.17 (D. Utah. 1997) (following the
“majority” position that late-arriving shrinkwrap licenses are invalid “contracts
of adhesion, unconscionable, and/or unacceptable pursuant to the U.C.C.”),
vacated on other grounds, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999); Wachter Mgmt. Co. v.
Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 282 Kan. 365, 377–78 (2006) (adhering to “traditional
contract principles” and treating shrinkwrap agreements as a proposal to
modify the terms of the contract pursuant to UCC 2-209). For commentators,
see, e.g., Jean Braucher, Amended Article 2 and the Decision to Trust the Courts:
The Case Against Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms, Especially for
Software, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 753, 755 [hereinafter Braucher, Decision to Trust
the Courts] (arguing that a buyer does not agree to a seller’s delayed massmarket terms); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of
Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 110–11 (1997) (arguing that agreements
received so late in the transaction dissuade consumers from rejecting the terms
because of the high transaction costs already endured by the consumer);
Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1265 (arguing against enforcement of late-arriving
boilerplate because buyers, “[a]fter the purchase, . . . [have] already invested in
the particular products, and returning them would . . . require[] expending
additional time and effort”). Note that the sunk cost effect might cause an actual
consumer to be even less likely to return the computer than the theoretical
rational consumer. Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer
Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 129 (2007) (“Since the efforts to
become familiar with the transaction’s details are sunk, a natural tendency,
according to the framework proposed by behavioral law and economics, is to
ignore potentially adverse terms that the [standard form contract] may contain,
although this tendency is irrational according to traditional law and
economics.”).
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boilerplate earlier in the transaction. Such an approach can
indeed substantially decrease those costs—a necessary and
welcome step towards a functioning market. It is not, however,
sufficient all on its own. Something else stands in the way, a
second and even more problematic shortcoming of the idealized
model of compensatory decisionmaking: the cost of processing
information about a product. It is to that issue that we now turn.
2. Information Processing
The second flaw in the idealized model of compensatory
decisionmaking has to do with consumers’ ability to process
information once they acquire it. Even if information about each
product and all its features is available, such that information
acquisition costs are low, consumers frequently lack the capacity
to evaluate that information and express their preferences
accordingly.
The problem here is information overload. Again, the car
rental example: Rental cars come in many shapes and sizes, with
a variety of features (both contractual and not): make, model,
color, transmission, mileage allotment, insurance coverage, and
more. Compensatory decisionmaking would require me to decide
how much each feature matters, rate it against the other
features, produce some sort of aggregate score, and then do the
same for the many other rental options the market offers.
This is a demanding information processing task. I must
make a high number of feature-to-feature comparisons and then
account for both the gradations of difference among them and the
value I attach to each such gradation. Do I value a sunroof more
than an automatic transmission? If so, by how much? And that’s
just two features. Contemplate the added complexity that would
come with a third—say, color. Would I choose an orange car with
a sunroof and manual transmission over a blue car with no
sunroof and an automatic transmission?
One can see how quickly the cost of processing such
information rises as market options expand. Consider the variety
of choices available for everyday purchases like food:
An ordinary supermarket contains 285 varieties of cookies,
including 21 chocolate chip options alone; 20 different types of
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Goldfish crackers; 13 “sports drinks,” 65 “box drinks,” and 85
flavors of juice; a dozen varieties of Pringles potato chips; 80
pain relievers; 40 lipstick shades; 16 varieties of instant
mashed potatoes, 75 different instant gravies, and 120
different pasta sauces; 175 different salad dressings; and a
whopping 275 types of cereal.30

And keep in mind that not only is there often a huge number of
competing products, but the products differ from one another
along multiple dimensions such that each has multiple features
to be weighed and compared. Do I want low-fat, Chewy Chips
Ahoy or Double-Stuf Oreos?31
Not surprisingly, then, empirical studies show that, for all
but the most basic transactions, the cost of processing
information makes compensatory decisionmaking a mere pipe
dream.32 Consumers abandon a purely compensatory strategy
when faced with as few as six options,33 process no more than five
30. Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When
Choice Impairs Social Welfare, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 24, 26 (2004).
31. The correct answer is the Oreos.
32. See Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J.
CONSUMER RES. 432, 435 (1984)
[T]he key finding to emerge [from studies of consumer
decisionmaking] is that consumers stop far short of overloading
themselves. They tend to examine only small proportions of the brand
and attribute information that is available. . . . Few findings
regarding consumer behavior have proven to be as consistent across
so many different procedures, contexts, products, investigators, and
so on.
See also Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision
Making, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 419, 427 (1982) (summarizing studies that show—
with remarkable consistency—a decline in optimal decisionmaking after the
number of data inputs exceeds ten). These findings seem to be offshoots of the
theory of the “magic number seven,” the conclusion from cognitive science that
people generally cannot retain and process more than approximately seven bits
of information in their short-term memories. See George A. Miller, The Magical
Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing
Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 95 (1956) (synthesizing research on
information processing in different contexts and concluding that “the span of
absolute judgment and the span of immediate memory impose severe limitations
on the amount of information that we are able to receive, process, and
remember”).
33. Denis A. Lussier & Richard W. Olshavsky, Task Complexity and
Contingent Processing in Brand Choice, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 154, 164 (1979).
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features of any particular option,34 and make decisions essentially
at random when faced with just four options that have four
features each.35 And the low levels of complexity at issue in these
studies do not even begin to represent the amount of information
that consumers frequently encounter in the real world.36
Moreover, not only is it clear that the typical consumer can only
process a limited (and surprisingly small) amount of product
information, but there is also some empirical evidence that, once
that limit is reached, providing more information and options is
worse than useless: it may actually reduce the consumer’s ability
to make the right choice.37
34. Id. at 162; see also Malhotra, supra note 32, at 423 (“[T]he probability of
correct choice decreases significantly as the number of attributes on which
information is provided increases from five to 15, 20, or 25.”).
35. Grether et al., supra note 10, at 297. Grether and his co-authors
curiously conclude that these findings support the proposition that “consumers
do not experience serious problems as a result of the amount of information that
markets and the state now generate,” id. at 294—a conclusion for which other
commentators rightly take them to task. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text
Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 308–09 (1986); Roberta Romano, A Comment on
Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and Their Implications for Public
Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 317 (1986).
36. The largest of the studies involve options that number in the teens or
twenties, with a similar number of features per option. E.g., Malhotra, supra
note 32, at 420 (twenty-five options with up to twenty-five features). As Jacob
Jacoby points out in commenting on a sixteen-option, sixteen-feature study, the
real world presents consumers with considerably more information than that.
See Jacoby, supra note 32, at 434 (noting that there are approximately 150
cereal brands on the market and their packaging can contain over 100 items of
information).
37. See Kristin Diehl, When Two Rights Make a Wrong: Searching Too
Much in Ordered Environments, 42 J. MKTG. RES. 313, 314 (2005) (listing
reasons why more information can lead to worse decisions); Sheena S. Iyengar &
Emir Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset Allocation,
94 J. PUB. ECON. 530, 533–34 (2010) (finding small but significant negative
effect on 401(k) investment decisions as employees were offered more fund
options); Sheena Sethi-Iyengar et al., How Much Choice Is Too Much?
Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE:
NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 83, 88–91 (Olivia S. Mitchell &
Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004) (finding a 1.5% to 2% decrease in employee 401(k)
participation for every ten funds added to plan); Paul Slovic, Toward
Understanding and Improving Decisions, in 2 HUMAN PERFORMANCE AND
PRODUCTIVITY: INFORMATION PROCESSING AND DECISION MAKING 157, 168
(William C. Howell & Edwin A. Fleishman eds., 1982) (reporting study in which
horse-race handicappers’ predictions failed to improve and actually became
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So how do consumers respond to these insuperable
information costs? They simplify, usually by identifying just a few
salient, easily processed features and focusing on those, or at
least using them as a screening device to reduce the number of
products under consideration to a more manageable level at
which compensatory comparison is possible. They try to make a
satisfactory choice by sacrificing inquiry into certain features in
favor of pursuing inquiry into few, salient others—an approach
known as “satisficing.”38
Replacing a purely compensatory approach with a satisficing
strategy makes sense for consumers. Indeed, they may have no
other choice, given their inherent cognitive limitations and the
presence of so much information in the marketplace. But
satisficing has important implications for whether we can rely on
the market to adequately account for consumer preferences. After
all, by definition satisficing results in something other than an
optimal expression of consumer preferences.39 In other words, if a
particular product feature does not make the cut during the
satisficing process—i.e., if it is not one of the features that are
salient to consumers when they screen available options—then
there is less reason to believe that the market is sending the right
signal to sellers about the desirability of that feature.40
more inconsistent as available information increased); see also Jeffrey Davis,
Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical
Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841,
847–49 (1977) (citing studies).
38. Grether et. al, supra note 10, at 287–88. The term satisficing was
coined by Herbert Simon, one of the godfathers of behavioral economics, in
Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63
PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 136 (1956).
39. Over the years, different commentators have used different definitions
of satisficing. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 214–15 (defining satisficing
as searching until one finds an option that meets certain predetermined criteria
at which point the choice is made and the search stops); Grether et al., supra
note 10, at 287–88 (defining satisficing as used in main text above); see also
Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1223–25 (describing various simplifying strategies
that consumers use in response to information processing costs). For present
purposes, these distinctions make no difference because they all stand for the
proposition that, in the real world, consumers depart from compensatory
decisionmaking.
40. See Botti & Iyengar, supra note 30, at 27 (“[T]he objective of reducing
the cognitive costs involved in making the choice can produce suboptimal
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What do information processing costs mean for boilerplate?
According to contract law, very little. Courts and legislatures
tend to assume that the problem, if any, is information
acquisition, and thus that early disclosure of terms is all that
consumers need.41 Other than the anemic doctrine of
unconscionability (to which we will return later),42 current law is
largely silent on the issue.43
The law may be silent, but a chorus of commentators has
argued that information processing costs can routinely prohibit
the reading of boilerplate even when it is provided early in the
transaction.44 And empirical studies (mostly of the software
industry) have begun to confirm this suspicion that information
acquisition is only half of the problem. One study of more than six
hundred software contracts found a lack of correlation between
competitive market conditions and the content of boilerplate

decisions and subsequent dissatisfying outcomes.”); Naresh K. Malhotra,
Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision
Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436, 438 (1984) (“While consumers may employ
heuristics to limit the intake of information, these heuristics may often involve a
tradeoff between simplifying and optimizing.”). Even those who have strong
faith in the market admit that satisficing departs from the optimal. E.g.,
Grether et al., supra note 10, at 287 (noting that a consumer engaged in
satisficing could make a choice “that fails to include the consumer’s most
preferred product—the one which would be chosen if every product in the
market were inspected”).
41. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 657–58 (2011) (reviewing the law on
mandatory disclosure of contract terms).
42. See infra Part V.A.
43. The incapacity doctrine is one way in which contract law already
accepts the proposition that cognitive ability should play a role in enforceability,
at least at the extreme. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 212–13 (“[T]he doctrine
of capacity rests on the ‘assumption that incompetents, properly defined, require
protection from their own actions,’ so that the premise of the bargain principle,
that a contracting party will act with full cognition to rationally maximize his
subjective expected utility, is not fulfilled.” (footnote omitted)). For a
comprehensive review of contract doctrines that address information processing
costs for boilerplate, see Hillman & Rachlinksi, supra note 8, at 454–60.
44. E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 247; Gillette, supra note 7, at 682;
Hillman, supra note 1, at 850; Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1217; Rakoff, supra
note 1, at 1226.
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terms,45 suggesting that boilerplate does not respond to
competitive pressures.46 And in a study of online software
purchases, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler tracked one month of
Internet click-stream data for 47,399 website visitors.47 Her
finding? Even if the seller forces consumers to click “I agree” and
provides a direct link to the boilerplate, only one in every two
hundred consumers reads it—and that’s under a very liberal
definition of “read” that includes any consumer that spends at
least one second on the page where the adhesive terms are
available.48 (Relaxing these limitations led to an even lower
reading rate.)49

45. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard
Form Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 447, 451 (2008). In fact, a competitive market might be worse for
consumers; monopolists can afford to offer decent contract terms, whereas
“competition forces sellers to exploit the biases and misperceptions of their
customers.” Oren Bar-Gill, Competition and Consumer Protection: A Behavioral
Economics Account 2 (NYU Ctr. Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 11-42,
2011).
46. A related study found that boilerplate that was available early in the
transaction was no more pro-consumer than boilerplate that arrived later,
suggesting that lowering the costs of information acquisition does not
necessarily lead to different contract terms. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are
“Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software
License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 333 (2009). Of course, this finding
might be read to show that all boilerplate is responsive to consumer preferences,
rather than that no boilerplate is. And the study’s absolute measure of “proconsumer” versus “pro-seller” should be taken with a grain of salt because it
uses the methodology from an earlier study in which the maximum proconsumer score for a contract was six and the maximum pro-seller score was
seventeen. Marotta-Wurgler, Empirical Analysis, supra note 6. Nevertheless, for
comparative purposes—determining whether one contract is more pro-consumer
than another—the methodology is sufficiently reliable.
47. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 167 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 106–10 (2012) [hereinafter MarottaWurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?].
48. See id. at 108 (finding that only 0.52% of such consumers spend more
than one second on the contract web page); see also id. at 110 (concluding that
“the primary cost [to consumers] lies not in locating and accessing EULAs, but
rather in reading and assessing contract terms”).
49. See id. at 108 (finding a rate of only 0.13% when the boilerplate is not
directly called to the consumer’s attention and 0.00% when it takes more than
one click of the mouse to locate it).
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This, in sum, is the boilerplate problem. If a contract term is
merely a product feature, then more terms mean more features.
More features mean more complexity. More complexity increases
the use of satisficing strategies that eliminate boilerplate from
consumers’ decisionmaking calculus. And if consumers routinely
eliminate boilerplate from their decisionmaking, the justification
for its enforcement—the protection of the marketplace through
the collective power of competition—goes away.
III. A Vertical Study of Boilerplate
We have now seen that the problem of information costs
casts doubt on whether the market registers consumer
preferences regarding boilerplate. We have also seen some
emerging empirics that suggest that this concern is more than
theoretical. In this Part, I offer a different lens through which to
view the boilerplate problem: a “vertical” study that
contextualizes both information acquisition and information
processing within the realities of consumer decisionmaking.
A. Verticality’s Advantages
The existing empirical studies that examine information
costs in the world of boilerplate share one important limitation:
they examine one stratum of individual contracts, all of a kind,
and assume that this single contract defines the entire
transaction.50 Even the click-stream study, which tracked actual
consumer interactions with boilerplate, limited itself to
interactions with a single kind of contract in a simple one-off
transaction (the purchase of a stand-alone item of software).51
50. See studies cited supra notes 6, 45–49. This is not meant as a criticism;
those studies were designed to measure something other than the overall
consumer experience. For example, one study was primarily interested in
identifying the balance of pro-seller versus pro-consumer terms. MarottaWurgler, Empirical Analysis, supra note 6, at 679.
51. See Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, supra note 47
(examining software licensing agreements in the context of purchasing a single
item of software). The issue is not that the click-stream study focuses only on
software licensing; the issue is that by focusing on any one kind of contract and
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That sort of “horizontal” analysis is revealing, but its focus on
a single kind of contract, and nothing else, means that it
sacrifices depth for breadth. In contrast, a “vertical” analysis
would look at fewer contracts of any one kind, but would situate
the consumer’s encounter with those contracts in the real world—
an encounter in which the boilerplate is only part of a
transaction, not its entirety. Consider software licensing.
Sometimes consumers encounter software boilerplate in the sort
of one-off horizontal context that earlier studies have focused
on.52 But other times they encounter software boilerplate as part
of an overall shopping experience, an experience that also
presents noncontractual features to be evaluated, and indeed
often involves multiple vendors and multiple contracts.53
Measuring the consumer experience vertically, from top to
bottom, therefore provides a uniquely instructive view of
information costs and the tradeoffs that consumers make in
deciding which features to evaluate and when.
In other words, a horizontal study tells us something about
the practices of a given industry, but it tells us less about the
consumer experience in dealing with that industry and the true
information costs that the industry imposes on consumers. A
vertical study can overcome that deficiency. After all, if
boilerplate is just one feature of a product, then a consumer’s
ability to acquire and process information about boilerplate is not
a function of the complexity of any one contract. It is a function of
the complexity of the entire transaction, soup to nuts. Therefore,
if we want to know when in the transaction the consumer
assuming that it represents the totality of the transaction, one can draw only
limited conclusions about consumer ability to acquire and process information in
a real-world context.
52. Thus the saying in the software world, “The license is the product.” See,
e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on the
Promise of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 891, 896 (1998) (“For most software products, the license is the
product; the computer program provides functionality to the user, but the
license delivers the use rights.”).
53. See Leff, supra note 10, at 146–47 (noting that “when one stands far
enough back from the whole deal, from the whole process of goods buying, what
one sees is a unitary, purchased bundle” and that boilerplate is just one part of
“the whole ‘set’”).
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encounters boilerplate (a factor of vital importance to information
acquisition costs) and how much total transactional complexity
the consumer encounters (a factor of vital importance to
information processing costs), a vertical study is the way to go.54
What would such a study look like? As explained in more
detail below, my approach was to purchase personal computers
and measure both the volume of boilerplate (the “how much”
factor) that came with them, and the point in the transactions at
which I encountered each bit of boilerplate (the “when” factor). I
chose this approach for four reasons.
First, a computer purchase is exactly the kind of transaction
that shows the advantages of a vertical analysis. From the
consumer’s point of view, buying a computer is a single
transaction, with a one-time, lump-sum price term. Yet the
product to be purchased presents the consumer with many
different features that emerge at different points in time.
Examining such a transaction therefore allows one to track both
the “when” and the “how much” aspects of information cost.
Second, most of the scholarship and case law in this area
focuses on the computer industry. Indeed, some of the
foundational cases on consumers and boilerplate specifically
involve computer purchases.55 Therefore, regardless of one’s
views on the study’s broader application, it is germane to an
important debate in the field—and to an industry that generates
around $50 billion annually from such purchases.56
Third, a computer purchase involves a high degree of
contractual complexity. It thus demonstrates the critical role that
information costs play in boilerplate’s enforceability. One can
54. Of course, a vertical case study of this kind constitutes just one
example of a consumer’s encounter with boilerplate. In a sense, then, this
approach is the mirror opposite of the horizontal approach in that it sacrifices
breadth for depth.
55. E.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Klocek
v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
56. The recent economic downturn has affected personal computer sales,
dropping domestic earnings from $51.3 billion in 2007 to a low of $45.8 billion in
2009. DATAMONITOR, PCS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2011). But the numbers
have begun to bounce back, with $47.2 billion earned in 2010—and volume rose
steadily even during the recession, from 62.4 million units in 2006 to 75.7
million in 2010. Id. at 10–11.
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imagine transactions with comparable vertical complexity (for
example, a vacation package that includes flights, hotels, tours,
and of course a rental car), as well as transactions that are much
simpler (for example, buying a loaf of bread). But as we will see in
Part V,57 part of my thesis is that the enforceability of boilerplate
should vary with the overall complexity of the transaction, and
starting with an example that involves high complexity helps
drive that point home.
Finally, contracts and complexity are inextricably
intertwined in the market for information goods. Sellers have
significant incentives to offer merchandise that, like a computer
system, comprises many different products that could have been
sold separately—and to then use boilerplate to restrict
consumers’ resale of the individual products within. This
strategy, known as bundling, allows sellers to sell a set of goods
to consumers at a unitary price even though particular
consumers attach disparate values to the set’s individual
components.58 For example, the Microsoft Office Home and
Student suite, available for $150, contains four separate
programs (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and OneNote).59 Some
consumers may value Word, Excel, and PowerPoint at $40 each
and OneNote at $30, whereas others value Word, Excel, and
PowerPoint at $30 each and OneNote at $60. Selling the suite at
$150 satisfies both groups and generates more surplus than could
be gained from selling the same consumers each program as a

57. In particular, see the discussion of procedural unconscionability in Part
V.A.
58. Nobel laureate George Stigler first introduced this concept in George J.
Stigler, United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SUP. CT.
REV. 152, 152 (1963) (discussing the strategy as employed through the concept
of “block-booking” of movies). The “bundling” label came later. See, e.g., Yannis
Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and
Efficiency, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1613, 1613 (1999) (studying the strategy of “bundling”
a large number of information goods).
59. See Buy Microsoft Office 2010, MICROSOFT, http://office.microsoft.
com/en-us/buy/buy-office-2010-FX101843016.aspx?WT.mc_id=ODC_ENUS_OAT
ExcelHome_MonBuy (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (listing the “one household, three
PCs” price) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The Microsoft
Office example appears in CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES:
A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 75–76 (1998).
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standalone product at a unitary price.60 But for bundling to
succeed, the seller must be able to prevent arbitrage;61 the
strategy will not work if, for example, a consumer who values
OneNote at $30 can unbundle it from the suite and resell it as a
standalone program to a consumer who values it at $60.62 Enter
boilerplate, which restricts consumers from doing that exact
thing.
For these reasons, then, a vertical study of the information
costs inherent in the purchase of an entire computer system can
teach us a lot about boilerplate enforceability in the real world.
To such a study we now turn.
B. Study Design
The subject matter of the study was the purchase of desktop
computers from the four top sellers of Windows-based computer
systems (Acer, Dell, HP, and Toshiba), which together make up
two-thirds of the domestic computer market.63 Each order
comprised just a single basic desktop unit and the software and
accessories that were included in the base price; any additional
hardware, software, or other option that required additional fees
was declined. I paid in full at the time the system was ordered,
had it shipped, opened the box, set it up, and started up various
60. Microsoft sells the components individually as well as in a suite—a
practice known as “mixed bundling.” See William James Adams & Janet L.
Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON. 475,
475 (1976). The standalone versions, however, are sold at a significant markup.
See Buy Microsoft Office 2010, supra note 59 (listing OneNote at $80 and the
other components at $140).
61. See Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 58, at 1614 (noting that one of the
conditions for analyzing bundling as a device for price discrimination is “no
reselling”).
62. Id.
63. See Gartner, Inc., Gartner Says Worldwide PC Shipments in Fourth
Quarter of 2011 Declined 1.4 Percent; Year-End Shipments Increased 0.5 Percent
(Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1893523 (last visited Feb.
4, 2013) (showing HP market share at 23.1%, Dell at 22.4%, Toshiba at 10.7%,
and Acer at 9.8%, for a total of 66.0%) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Due to funding limitations, the other major vendor (Apple, at 11.6%)
was not included.
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programs that came with it. All along the way, I kept track of the
boilerplate I encountered—every contract term that was
presented to me in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion.64
The most difficult part of the study design was deciding
which contracts should count. In the Dell purchase, for example, I
collected data on 186 different potential contracts. But
determining which of those 186 should be included in my tally
required two judgment calls.
1. Assumptions About Enforceability
The first and most important judgment call was to decide
which of the various terms I encountered would be viewed as
enforceable under current law. My goal was to be very
conservative—to include only those contracts that a court would
enforce without any real controversy. I achieved this goal through
the use of two narrowly conceived enforcement criteria: the
acceptance criterion and the availability criterion.
The acceptance criterion meant that I counted only those
contracts to which I had clearly and affirmatively manifested
assent.65 Usually this assent took the form of the classic “I agree”
or “I accept” mouse click—the classic “click-wrap” contract.66 So,
for example, at the end of Dell’s online order process I
encountered the screen depicted in Figure 1, which asked me to
affirmatively manifest agreement to Dell’s Terms and Conditions
of Sale. Any court would find that selecting the “I AGREE” option
and then submitting the order, as I did, was a manifestation of

64. This meant that contractual terms for which I had an array of options
(for example, shipping) were not included in the tally.
65. Some courts have upheld adhesion contracts without explicit
manifestations of assent. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147,
1150 (7th Cir. 1997). But I applied an explicit acceptance criterion because other
cases suggest that terms that arrive after purchase are binding only if
acceptance is unequivocal. See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d
1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000).
66. The origin of the term click-wrap is obscure, but it at least dates back to
1996. See Koh Su Haw, E-Commerce: Technology Can Bypass the Legal Pitfalls,
BUS. TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 14, 1996, at 16 (defining “click-wrap”).
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assent to be bound.67 Those Terms and Conditions of Sale
therefore counted in my tally.
Figure 1

In contrast, the bottom of the screen in Figure 1 contained
some classic, barely perceptible “fine print” (e.g., “Offers subject
to change.”) in gray font on a black background. These terms
were not included in my analysis. Although some courts would
undoubtedly enforce them, the lack of an affirmative
manifestation of assent meant that enforceability was too
uncertain to merit inclusion under my conservative
assumptions.68 Similarly, some courts would enforce the various
policies that one could access by clicking on the hyperlinks above
67. See Nathan J. Davis, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of
Click-Wrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 583 (2007) (“[C]ourts have almost
uniformly found assent when the user clicks while having notice of the terms.”).
68. E.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 19–30 (2d Cir.
2002) (finding no online contract formation when assent was ambiguous and
terms were relegated to the bottom of the web page).
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the fine print (e.g., “© 2010 Dell” and “Limited Warranty”)69—but
not all courts would do so,70 so I did not count them either. The
same goes for the hyperlinks indicated by the arrow in Figure 2;
those links were prominently displayed next to a contract to
which I did clearly manifest assent (the Terms and Conditions of
Sale), but it was not clear that acceptance of the latter
constituted acceptance of the additional contractual terms that
one would reach by following those links, so I did not include
them in my tally.
My second criterion, availability, meant that the terms to
which I manifested assent had to be easily accessible if they were
to count in the overall tally. In the online context, it is common
for contract terms to be located on a separate web page from the
assent mechanism, rather than being forced upon the user as
part of that mechanism.71 Figure 1’s reference to Dell’s Terms
and Conditions of Sale provides an example; those terms were
available with a single click of a mouse on the prominent
hyperlink next to “I AGREE.” To remain conservatively
consistent with the relevant case law, I counted such terms only
if one could follow the given hyperlink (or nonhyperlinked web
address) and find them no more than two web pages away.72 In
69. E.g., Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No. 4:07CV1963, 2009 WL 586513, at
*4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2009) (finding defendant bound by browse-wrap agreement
even absent affirmative assent because “[a] link to the full text of the user
agreement is found at the bottom of the very web page that [defendant used]”
and “[t]he user agreement specifically states that users consent to be bound . . .
by . . . using the website”); Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982
(E.D. Cal. 2000) (refusing to dismiss breach of contract claim involving “browse
wrap license” and noting that although “the user is not immediately confronted
with the notice of the license agreement, this does not dispose of [plaintiff’s]
breach of contract claim”).
70. E.g., Specht, 306 F.3d at 19–30.
71. See Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps,
Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to
the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 20 (2011) (surveying eight popular
service providers’ methods for acquiring consent to terms of service and finding
that all of them provided links to the terms rather than displaying them
directly).
72. E.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839–40 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (enforcing a contract found one click away); Kwan v. Clearwire Corp., No.
C09-1392JLR, slip op. at 10–11 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2012) (finding no assent
when a consumer had to click on three links to locate a contract).

188

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (2013)

addition, it had to be obvious which boilerplate applied; if a link
led to a menu of undifferentiated contracts, and the consumer
could not easily identify the correct one, then I would not count
any of them.
Figure 2

These two criteria also guided the inclusion of terms that
were incorporated by reference in qualifying boilerplate (a
common occurrence in the online world). First, acceptance: the
actual text of the originating contract had to include a reference
to the incorporated terms, such that acceptance of the former
implied acceptance of the latter. Second, availability: the
incorporated terms had to be easily accessible to the reader of the
originating contract. For example, the text of Dell’s Terms and
Conditions of Sale contained a hyperlink to a Return Policy (in
such a manner that it was clear that acceptance of the one
constituted acceptance of the other), and the hyperlink led
directly to the Return Policy terms. In contrast, a later “Service
Contracts” hyperlink within the Terms and Conditions of Sale
failed to satisfy the availability criterion; it took two mouse clicks
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just to get to a menu of potentially applicable contracts, and it
was not entirely clear which of them applied. Therefore, the
Return Policy was included in the overall volume measurement
but the Service Contracts were not.
2. Assumptions About the Scope of the Transaction
The second judgment call inherent in my analysis involved
which software boilerplate to include. As we all know, when you
start up a computer for the first time, you find all sorts of
programs that you may not have known were part of your
purchase—games, trial versions of software, system accessories,
and so forth. Opening such programs often leads to click-wrap
boilerplate. Should such contracts be counted in the study?
As before, my approach here was conservative; I only
included contracts associated with programs and features that
the seller had represented as part of the deal when I ordered the
computer. A reasonable purchaser might expect more programs
than that as a practical matter because extras like media players
and DVD burners come standard on most computers. But a
conservative approach to contract law would tell us that the
purchaser only has a right to expect those programs that were
explicitly promised.
Again, I did not pay extra for any of this software; all of it
came with the computer. And of course the same enforceability
criteria applied here; none of the software contracts counted
unless I clearly and affirmatively manifested assent and could
easily access their terms.
In the aggregate, what these conservative assumptions mean
is that the study almost certainly underestimates information
costs that boilerplate truly imposed in the transaction, perhaps
by a wide margin.73 The acceptance criterion means that the word
73. To take just one example, my conservative criteria ended up excluding
a lot of arbitration procedures, despite the fact that a court would almost
certainly find that the presence of arbitration clauses binds the consumer to use
those procedures. In most cases, however, those procedures were excluded
because they failed to satisfy the availability criterion: the arbitration clauses
usually linked to the home page of an arbitration organization (e.g., the
American Arbitration Association or JAMS), rather than to the particular
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count includes only those contracts that very clearly alerted the
consumer to the need to search for terms because it was very
clear that proceeding with the transaction meant agreeing to be
bound. And more important, the availability criterion means that
only those contracts that could be easily located would qualify—
even though in reality courts might enforce contracts that are
much harder to find. In several important respects, then, the
study makes information costs look less costly than they really
are.
C. Study Results
Even under the conservative assumptions outlined above, the
four purchases produced a weighted average of twenty-five
binding contracts totaling 74,897 words.74 In other words, the
average computer purchase binds the consumer to twenty-five
contracts, comprising 74,897 words of boilerplate. To put that
word count in perspective, it’s just a tad less than the number of
words in the first Harry Potter book.75 Of course, Harry Potter is a
arbitration procedures to which the consumer would be bound—and it took
several clicks of the mouse and some guesswork to find those procedures on the
organization’s website. Nevertheless, a court would almost certainly say that
the consumer had a contractual obligation to arbitrate and to use those
procedures. (For instance, the arbitration clause that was upheld in Cavalier
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 2003), merely stated that
disputes would be arbitrated under American Arbitration Association (AAA)
procedures, with no hyperlink to the AAA website, let alone to the procedures
themselves. Brief of Appellant Cavalier Manufacturing, Inc. at 5, Cavalier Mfg.
v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 2003).).
74. The exact figures were 24.75 contracts and 74,897.19 words. A
weighted average was used so that data from sellers with a greater market
share would receive proportionately more emphasis in the calculation, under the
theory that consumers are more likely to buy products from them than from
their competitors. The weights used correspond to the market share figures from
supra note 63. (The non-weighted average would not have been much different:
twenty-three contracts comprising 71,828 words.) See the Appendices for a full
breakdown of the figures discussed in this section.
75. Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone totaled 76,944 words, according to
the never-wrong Internet. See Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone, THE
HARRY POTTER LEXICON, http://www.hp-lexicon.org/about/books/ps/book_ps.html
(last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (citing the book’s publisher for a word count) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Granted, the Harry Potter books got
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page-turner, whereas boilerplate contracts are anything but. So
perhaps a better analogy is tax forms: you could read every word
of the instruction booklet for IRS Form 1040a, cover to cover—all
eighty-eight pages—and still be more than a thousand words
short of the boilerplate total from this single computer
purchase.76 Or, for the truly masochistic among you, try reading
this Article, and then do it again, and then once more. And don’t
skip the footnotes this time.

much longer; J.K. Rowling really started to get verbose with the 107,253 words
of book three. See Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban, THE HARRY POTTER
LEXICON, http://www.hp-lexicon.org/about/books/pa/book_pa.html (last visited
Feb. 4, 2013) (citing the book’s publisher for a word count) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). One suspects that the success of the series
had put Rowling beyond the influence of any editor by this point; the fourth
book was even longer, and the fifth book set the record for the series, clocking in
at 257,045 words! See Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix, THE HARRY
POTTER LEXICON, http://www.hp-lexicon.org/about/books/op/book_op.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2013) (citing the book’s publisher for a word count) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
76. Cutting and pasting the text of the 2011 1040a instructions from the
PDF (at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040a.pdf) into Microsoft Word resulted
in a word count of 73,509. IRS, I.R.S. 1040A Instructions 2011 (Nov. 25, 2011),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040a.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Table 1: Summary of Results
No. of Words . . .

Seller
Acer
Dell
HP
Toshiba
Total
Total
Unique
Raw
Average
Weighted
Average

. . . at
program
startup

. . . overall
33,128
78,203
79,340
96,641

. . . at
purchase
9,135
9,765
0
18,678

. . . at
computer
startup
23,993
24,165
24,328
34,744

93

287,312

37,578

107,230

142,504

56

161,767

39,065
[24.1%]

38,225
[23.6%]

84,477
[52.2%]

23.25

71,828

9,394

26,807

35,626

91.7

74,897

7,698
[10.3%]

25,911
[34.6%]

41,286
[55.1%]

93.2

No. of
Contracts
12
29
25
27

24.75

0
44,273
55,012
43,219

. . . per $
47.1
84.7
103.4
131.5

1. Information Acquisition Costs
The number of words is informative, and we will return to
the question of total volume when we consider information
processing costs (the “how much” question). First, however, what
does the study tell us about the cost of information acquisition?
Even with the conservative assumptions discussed above, one
acquisition issue comes through loud and clear—an issue one can
appreciate only through a vertical study: the “when” question. At
what stage of the transaction was each contract encountered?
Of the 74,897 total words, only 7,699 (10.3%) were presented
to me by the time I had to decide whether to order (and pay for)
the computer.77 I had to wait until the computer arrived before
the rest were made available. Of the remaining 67,198 words,
25,912 (34.6%) were presented when the computer arrived and

77. Note that if I had bought the computer in a store instead of online,
many of the website’s boilerplate terms would have arrived as paperwork in the
box, or would have been presented to me on startup. Whether those
presentations would have satisfied my enforceability criteria is an issue I did
not explore.
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was first started up, and the other 41,287 (55.1%) when
individual programs were opened.78
In other words, the verticality of the study shows how very
pertinent the issue of late-arriving terms is. At the time that
consumers tender payment, they will have had no opportunity to
express their preferences regarding nine out of every ten words to
which they will become contractually bound. Of course, they will
eventually have the opportunity to explicitly say no to these latearriving terms, and thus to communicate their preferences to the
market.79 But that opportunity arises only after a considerable
investment in acquiring the information that would bear on
formation of those preferences—the time spent navigating the
website, deciding which computer to buy, placing the order,
waiting for the shipment, starting up the computer, and opening
the various programs to find the applicable contractual language.
That investment represents a considerable information
acquisition cost. In essence, by the time I have an opportunity to
express my preferences to the market, I am no longer at the
market. I am already home.
Moreover, the true acquisition cost imposed by late-arriving
terms would actually be a multiple of the cost I experienced in my
study because, for a market to function most effectively,
consumer decisionmaking should be not only compensatory but
78. I might have been able to find some of the late-arriving boilerplate by
searching the websites of the software providers before deciding to purchase.
But such an approach would have carried acquisition costs of its own, and it is
far from certain that I could have located the correct terms. See Jean Braucher,
Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive
Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1860–61 (2000) [hereinafter Braucher, Delayed
Disclosure] (finding that 87.5% of software websites did not make boilerplate
available to consumers pre-purchase); James F. Rodriguez, Software End User
Licensing Agreements: A Survey of Industry Practices in the Summer of 2003,
at 2 (unpublished and undated manuscript) (finding that only twelve of fortythree major software companies provided license terms on their websites, none
provided an easily identifiable pre-purchase link to the terms, and only two
offered a website search capability enabling users to find the terms) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
79. This opportunity to explicitly manifest or refuse express assent is what
makes the boilerplate term enforceable, even under the most consumer-friendly
cases, such as Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339–41 (D. Kan.
2000) (noting that late-arriving terms are enforceable if consumers “expressly
agree[] to them”).
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comparative. Consumers do not decide whether they will
purchase a given product in the abstract; they decide whether to
purchase it in light of the options available from other sellers.
This means that for a consumer to truly express his or her
market preferences regarding late-arriving boilerplate, he or she
would have to order multiple computers, start them all up, open
the programs on each, and then examine the boilerplate within.
To make such a comparison between the four computers in this
study would have meant reading fifty-six unique contracts
totaling 161,767 words.80
Finally, having made that comparison and decided which
terms to reject, the consumer would have to register that
rejection with the marketplace—e.g., by returning the rejected
feature and receiving a corresponding refund. Even if we
generously assume that the seller’s return policy allows for this
possibility, it is far from clear how it would work in practice. How
could one return, say, the antivirus software but retain the
operating system (and what would the refund be)? If the return
really turns out to be an all-or-nothing proposition, then it sends
a weak signal to the marketplace because it would not be clear
which features prompted the rejection. And even if these
obstacles could be overcome, the return process adds more
expense (including both the hassle and the possibility of
restocking fees), which means more information acquisition costs.

80. When all the boilerplate in the four transactions is added together,
there were ninety-three contracts totaling 287,312 words. Appendix A. But there
was some overlap among these contracts (for example, each seller offered the
same Microsoft Windows license), so the number of unique contracts was lower.
This demonstrates the intuitive notion that comparison among products is
easier if each seller offers the exact same features—but that is hardly an
argument for market function; it simply substitutes an antitrust problem for an
information cost problem. Note also that more of the unique contracts arrived
early in the transaction, such that a consumer who bought all four computers
for comparison purposes would have encountered nearly one out of every four
unique terms (24.1%) before submitting payment, rather than one out of every
ten (10.3%).
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2. Information Processing Costs
The analysis so far has shown that the costs of acquiring
information about boilerplate are a significant impediment to
compensatory decisionmaking. As we have already seen, however,
the cost of processing information can constitute a separate and
equally problematic obstacle to market function. So what does the
case study have to teach us about the information processing
costs associated with boilerplate?
The issue here is one of sheer volume of terms—the “how
much” question. A few empiricists have taken note, mostly in
passing, of the volume of boilerplate terms that sellers present to
consumers. For example, one of Marotta-Wurgler’s horizontal
studies found an average length of 1,500 words for the typical
end-user license agreement in the software industry.81 And a
horizontal study of the boilerplate that accompanied the top fifty
programs at Download.com for 2006 found an average of 2,752
words and a nearly-college-level readability.82
Here again, we see the advantages of a study that looks
vertically at all the boilerplate in a single transaction. As noted
above, even under my conservative assumptions, the average
computer purchase results in 74,897 words of binding contracts.
This finding casts the information overload problem in sharp
relief. Even if all that boilerplate were presented up front—i.e.,
even if the acquisition problem were solved—consumers could not
engage in compensatory decisionmaking unless they first paid the
processing cost of reading and understanding the terms well
enough to form preferences and compare them to other sellers’
contractual offerings.
Whether consumers would pay that cost depends on how
high it is. Recall that consumers who confront complex products
(like computers) minimize those costs by satisficing—ignoring
certain features in favor of others. The higher the cost of
processing boilerplate, then, the more likely consumers are to
81. Marotta-Wurgler, Empirical Analysis, supra note 6, at 694.
82. Jens Grossklags & Nathan Good, Empirical Studies on Software
Notices to Inform Policy Makers and Usability Designers, in FINANCIAL
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 341, 346–47 (Sven Dietrich & Rachna
Dhamija eds., 2007).
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ignore it and turn their attention instead to other, more salient
product features.83
The question, then, is how to measure the cost of processing
74,897 words of boilerplate. One potential answer is to measure
the time one would need to read all those terms. A few studies
have examined how long it takes the average person to read legal
text. The most relevant, conducted by Michael Masson and Mary
Anne Waldron, presented subjects with short excerpts from four
contracts (a mortgage, a property sale, a bank loan, and a lease
renewal) and measured how long it took to read and understand
them.84 That study’s application here is somewhat complicated by
the fact that it also explored the effect of using “plain English” in
contracts, so it tested four different versions of each contract
(with varying degrees of complexity in wording) and thus did not
produce a single average reading rate.85 Furthermore, because it
involved short excerpts of a few hundred words each rather than
long contracts,86 its results might not be a precise fit for the
contracts at issue here, which averaged 3,016 words; perhaps
reading speed increases as one goes along, or declines as one gets
tired. Nevertheless, by averaging the reading rates for the
various contracts in the study, we can reach a fair estimate of
how fast the typical consumer can read contractual language:
177.5 words per minute.87
At that rate, the 74,897 words worth of boilerplate would
take just over seven hours to read (assuming, optimistically, that
83. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
84. See generally Michael E.J. Masson & Mary Anne Waldron,
Comprehension of Legal Contracts by Non-Experts: Effectiveness of Plain
Language Redrafting, 8 APPLIED COG. PSYCHOL. 67 (1994).
85. Id. at 74–75. There is no easy way to determine which of the
experiment’s different wording categories the contracts at issue here would fall
under. Note that one study of complexity in consumer contracts suggests that
shorter contracts are easier to comprehend, although that result is confounded
somewhat by the fact that the shorter contract was also written in simpler
language. See Davis, supra note 37, at 869.
86. Masson & Waldron, supra note 84, at 71.
87. I arrived at this figure by taking the study’s four entire-document
reading rates and averaging them. Id. at 74 tbl.4. One might object to using an
average, rather than one of the specific rates that Masson and Waldron found,
but it would make little difference; the four rates only ranged from a low of
167.0 to a high of 193.6. Id.
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the reader could keep up the pace for that long without a moment’s
rest).88 Therefore, even if all the contracts had been presented to
the reader at the outset of the transaction, such that information
acquisition costs were low, the information processing costs of
actually reading the contracts would be significant—further
evidence that consumers would focus instead on other product
features and thus fail to register their preferences regarding
boilerplate terms. And, as with acquisition costs, consumers who
wish to make an apples-to-apples comparison would also have to
read the contracts that competing vendors offered; to do so with
the four competing products at issue here would have meant more
than fifteen hours of reading.89
Yet even this conclusion may underestimate the amount of
information overload because, when it comes to boilerplate,
compensatory decisionmaking requires not only reading but
understanding.90 Masson and Waldron used two mechanisms
(question-answering and paraphrasing) to measure how well
their subjects understood the contracts at the above reading
speed—and found them wanting.91 Comprehension improved
when archaic terms were replaced, yet even then “performance of
subjects on both the question-answering and the paraphrase
tasks remained relatively poor (in the best cases average
performance ranged from about one-third to two-thirds correct,
depending on which aspect of comprehension was measured) and
misconceptions were apparent across all versions of the
documents.”92 In other words, even at the relatively slow reading
rate of 177.5 words per minute, a substantial subset of consumers
88. 74,897 words ÷ 177.5 words/minute = 421.95 minutes, or 7.03 hours.
89. As explained supra note 80, there was some overlap among the
boilerplate that each seller offered, so consumers who had already read one
seller’s boilerplate would be able to save some time when they got to the next
seller.
90. Note also that part of the problem with boilerplate is that consumers
can’t know what it covers without at least skimming it. In a sense, then,
consumers don’t know whether they should read boilerplate until after they
have done so! At a minimum, it takes some effort even to determine whether
learning the contents of boilerplate can be discounted in favor of learning about
other product features.
91. Masson & Waldron, supra note 84, at 72.
92. Id. at 79.
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would have a hard time understanding boilerplate and
consequently would have a hard time forming and expressing
compensatory and comparative preferences regarding contractual
terms.93
Another way to get a sense of information processing costs is
to express them in dollars per word. After all, computers are
expensive—the four in the study averaged $782.24—and one
might tolerate higher information costs when spending a lot of
money, so as to ensure that a big expenditure produces a
worthwhile payoff. Even under this metric, however, the
information costs are significant. The 74,897 words of boilerplate
worked out to a weighted average of ninety-three words per dollar
spent. For comparison’s sake, imagine having to read ninetythree words of boilerplate each time you buy a can of soda, or 279
words when buying a three-dollar gallon of milk, or 5,580 words
when filling a twenty-gallon tank with gas. And none of the
contracts here seemed to be related to my choice to buy
moderately powerful computers, so more affordable models would
likely have come with exactly the same contracts.
In the end, however one chooses to measure information
costs, the evidence strongly suggests that the market would not
be responsive to consumer preferences regarding the binding
boilerplate in this study. Consumers confronted with such
purchases would almost certainly ignore the boilerplate entirely;
the costs of finding and reading it are quite high, and they would
likely consider its terms to be less important than other, more
salient features of the transaction. (As a general matter,
boilerplate terms relate to rare events—the defective product, the
lost shipment, the litigious purchaser—for which the average
consumer has little legal exposure.94)
Boilerplate would accordingly be one of those product
features that would not make the cut when consumers,
overloaded
by
information,
abandon
compensatory
decisionmaking in favor of satisficing. And when consumers
93. For a discussion of how a representative subset of informed consumers
might avert market failure, see infra Part IV.A.
94. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 15, at 663; Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 243;
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 443; Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1226.
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ignore contract terms, the market ignores contract terms—
removing the justification for enforcement of those terms in the
first place.
IV. Responding to Boilerplate’s Defenders
In Part II, we saw that in transactions of even moderate
complexity, consumers satisfice; they abandon compensatory
decisionmaking and focus their limited attention on a few product
features. Horizontal studies of consumer decisionmaking have
begun to provide evidence that such satisficing threatens the
function of the boilerplate market. In Part III, I presented new,
vertical evidence of this dysfunction, showing that both
acquisition costs and processing costs are even higher than the
horizontal studies have shown. All in all, then, the evidence
suggests that boilerplate is high on the list of features that
consumers ignore.
If the enforceability of boilerplate terms depends on their
responsiveness to consumer preferences, it seems impossible to
defend enforcement when most consumers ignore those terms.
Yet scholars have offered two distinct arguments in favor of
enforcing boilerplate even in the face of the mounting evidence
that it goes unread. The first is an ex ante argument that the
market works, due to a sufficiently large subset of consumers
that actually do read the terms. The second is an ex post
argument that even when the market fails, reputational concerns
keep sellers from unduly aggressive enforcement of one-sided
terms.
If either of these arguments is correct, then this Article has
not proved anything, and no regulatory intrusion into the market
is necessary notwithstanding boilerplate’s information cost
problem. In the following discussion, however, I evaluate both
arguments, on their own merits and in light of the verticality
findings above, and find them wanting.
A. Informed-Minority Theory
No market functions perfectly. Information costs and other
impediments to compensatory decisionmaking are the rule, not
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the exception, even for transactions that involve no contractual
terms whatsoever.95 Therefore, although there is compelling
evidence that when it comes to boilerplate the market does not
function particularly well, the question is whether it functions
well enough.
The answer to this question depends partly on the available
alternatives to pure market regulation (“well enough” in
comparison to what?), an issue to which we will return in Part V.
But the answer also depends on how dysfunctional the market is.
In a perfectly functioning market, every consumer would
costlessly find, read, and understand all adhesive contract terms
and would then use compensatory decisionmaking to weigh their
impact in the purchase decision. As Alan Schwartz and Louis
Wilde have argued, however, a less-than-perfect market, in which
only some consumers pay attention to those terms, can produce
approximately the same outcome as a fully functional market, so
long as sellers compete for those marginal, attentive consumers.96
In other words, if information costs cause most but not all
consumers to ignore boilerplate, the consumers who do pay
attention—the “informed minority”—might represent the
interests of the ignorant, such that the resulting terms would
adequately reflect overall consumer preferences.97
Numerous commentators have relied on the Schwartz and
Wilde theory to argue that the market adequately responds to
consumer preferences even when many consumers are ignorant

95. See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer
Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 512 (1981) (“[V]irtually no consumer product
market or associated information market meets the textbook ideal of perfect
information and perfect competition.”); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 630
(“It is generally recognized . . . that information is never perfect; the
decisionmaker’s task, therefore, is to characterize, in terms of the need for
intervention, real world states that are intermediate between perfect
information and perfect ignorance.”).
96. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 638 (“Rather than asking whether
an idealized individual is sufficiently informed to maximize his own utility, the
appropriate normative inquiry is whether competition among firms for
particular groups of searchers is, in any given market, sufficient to generate
optimal prices and terms for all consumers.”); see also id. at 659–62 (offering
some observations about the implications of this theory for boilerplate).
97. Id. at 660.
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about its offerings.98 In the boilerplate context, however, this
argument depends on a number of questionable premises. First, it
assumes that the consumers who constitute the informed
minority have the same preferences (with regard to contractual
terms) as the ignorant majority.99 Yet we already know that the
members of the informed minority are different in at least one
important way: they read the boilerplate that the rest of us
ignore. Why would we think that they would be different in only
that one respect?100 By definition their payoff from reading a
contract is higher than most people’s, which suggests a different
valuation for the terms it contains.101 In short, for the informedminority theory to work, we must assume heterogeneity in the
98. E.g., Baird, supra note 10, at 936 (“The sophisticated buyer provides
protection for those that are entirely ignorant.”); Clayton Gillette, Pre-Approved
Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 975, 976–77 (2005) (noting
that the inability of a seller to distinguish attentive consumers from inattentive
consumers will prevent the seller from acting opportunistically); George L.
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1347
(1981) (“If a small group of consumers reads warranties and selects among
products according to warranty context, manufacturers may be forced to draft
warranties responsive to the group’s preferences, even though the large majority
of consumers generally neglect warranty terms.”).
99. If they don’t, they cannot represent the majority; they would send
sellers the wrong market signal. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 638
(“When the preferences of searchers are positively correlated with the
preferences of nonsearchers, competition among firms for searchers should tend
to protect all consumers.”).
100. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 15, at 671 (“All that we can know [about
members of the informed minority] is that they are particularly sensitive to
some aspect of the contract—not that the average consumer (or even just one
other consumer outside the marginal minority) necessarily shares their
preferences.”); id. at 676 (“[T]here is no guarantee—indeed it seems unlikely—
that the marginal consumer will be typical of other consumers.”).
101. Another possibility is that the informed minority comprises repeat
purchasers, who choose to incur the information costs because they can amortize
them across a number of purchases. Such purchasers might have idiosyncratic
preferences regarding the content of terms; for example, they would not care as
much about a class action waiver because their high volume would make it costefficient to sue individually. See Gillette, supra note 7, at 694. But even if their
preferences were the same as the ignorant majority’s, repeat buyers are more
likely to be accommodated when something goes wrong (even if the contract
does not require such accommodation)—which means that they will be less
worried about contractual guarantees and therefore less able to act as a proxy
for nonreaders. Id. at 692. And of course, the amortization argument assumes
that the boilerplate does not change over time; try telling that to an iTunes user.
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minority’s proclivity to read boilerplate but homogeneity in its
preferences for boilerplate terms—a dubious pair of assumptions
and a slim reed on which to build a theory of enforcement.
Second, even if the informed minority has the same
boilerplate preferences as the ignorant majority, the former
cannot adequately represent the latter if sellers can differentiate
between the two groups.102 Sellers that can differentiate will offer
better terms to the informed minority and continue to offer onesided terms to the uninformed majority, thereby delinking the
fates of the two groups and returning the latter market to a
largely nonresponsive state.103 How easy such differentiation
would be is an open question, dependent on the particular
industry at issue.104 In the online context, for example, one could
easily imagine a website offering different terms to different
consumers based on their browsing habits and the attention they
pay to boilerplate.105
102. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 638 (assuming that “it is
usually too expensive for firms to distinguish among extensive, moderate, and
nonsearchers” and that “it would often be too expensive to draft different
contracts for each of these groups even if they could conveniently be identified”);
id. at 663–64 (explicitly addressing this assumption).
103. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 15, at 656; Gillette, supra note 7, at 692;
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207, 228 (2006). Omri Ben-Shahar provides an interesting
example of how this differentiation can be done in the very body of the contract:
a clause in a residential Comcast contract offered an arbitration opt-out—which
would of course be seen only by the attentive (read: rare) reader. Omri BenShahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity To Read” in Contract Law, 6 EUR. REV.
CONT. L. 1, 20 (2009) [hereinafter Ben-Shahar, Opportunity To Read].
104. On a related note, Ted Cruz and Jeffrey Hinck see an inherent tension
between, on the one hand, the number of informed consumers and, on the other,
the ability of sellers to differentiate. The informed-minority theory grows more
plausible as the number of attentive readers necessary to adequately represent
the ignorant majority decreases—but Cruz and Hinck argue that “[t]he ability to
identify and segregate consumers . . . becomes much easier as the number of
informed buyers becomes smaller” and therefore “[u]nder such conditions, the
seller needs only to target a small proportion of his buyers to defeat the effect of
an informed minority upon the terms offered to uninformed consumers.” Cruz &
Hinck, supra note 15, at 656.
105. See Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers
in the Electronic Age, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 17 (2009) (exploring the possibility
that industries can “employ new e-technologies to segregate readers and offer
them more advantageous terms”); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 471–
72 (“E-businesses can use data on consumer behavior collected from their prior
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Finally, the market is likely to underproduce informed
consumers because the informed-minority theory creates a
collective action problem: only a few consumers incur the
information costs, but all consumers reap the resulting benefits.
This means that even consumers who are inclined to read the
boilerplate have an incentive to ignore it, sit back, and free-ride
on the efforts of others.106 In contrast, the seller always pays
careful attention to boilerplate terms because the seller is a party
to every transaction to which the terms apply and thus
internalizes all their benefits.107 (Indeed, the seller is the party
that drafted the terms.)
These arguments give us reason to doubt the informedminority theory, but the proof of the pudding is in the eating: are
boilerplate-reading consumers really common enough to
adequately represent the interests of their nonreading
counterparts? Schwartz and Wilde themselves are skeptical,
estimating that more than one in three consumers would have to
read the boilerplate for the informed-minority concept to work.108
Modeling and industry-specific empirics suggest that their
skepticism is well-founded.109 For example, one study of software
transactions and offer different terms to those consumers who are most likely to
read the boilerplate (or who have already read it during a prior site visit).”); cf.
Ben-Shahar, Opportunity To Read, supra note 103, at 20 (noting that contracts
can easily distinguish between readers and non-readers by offering an
opportunity to opt out of a clearly pro-seller term).
106. See Beales et al., supra note 95, at 503; Cruz & Hinck, supra note 15, at
668; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 447.
107. This is merely another way of stating the information asymmetry
problem familiar to those who study adhesion contracts. See, e.g., POSNER, supra
note 8, at 145; Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869,
901 (2011); Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 243.
108. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 10, at 661.
109. For modeling, see Cruz & Hinck, supra note 15, at 648–55 (concluding
that under reasonable assumptions “the proportion of consumers that must be
term-informed is somewhere between 10% and 30%, both of which are relatively
large given the impediments to formation of an informed minority”). For
empirics, see Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a
Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 3 (NYU Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 195, 2009) (finding an “informed minority . . . orders of
magnitude smaller than the required informed minority size in the theoretical
examples of Schwartz and Wilde”), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/
195.

204

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (2013)

retailers who made their licensing agreements available online
found that only two out of every one thousand shoppers accessed
the agreements for more than one second—and even that small
subset averaged less than a minute spent on the relevant web
page.110
Yet even these caveats do not fully capture the limitations of
the informed-minority theory because they consider boilerplate in
the abstract rather than as part of a complex, integrated
transaction. In other words, for a real-world perspective, we must
examine the impact of verticality on the informed-minority
theory. And as it turns out, verticality challenges the informedminority theory in two particular ways.
First, this Article’s vertical study reveals information costs
that are much higher than previous studies have shown; the
informed minority acquires almost all of the boilerplate late in
the transaction and faces more than seven hours of reading.111 As
these information costs increase, the number of contract readers
will shrink, all else being equal. After all, even those with an
idiosyncratic tendency to read boilerplate must deal with their
own finite resources and cognitive limitations. And as the number
of readers shrinks, so does the likelihood that the informed
minority will be of sufficient size to serve as an adequate proxy.
Second, the added complexity of a fully vertical transaction
may increase the differences between the preferences of the
informed minority and the preferences of the ignorant majority,
such that the former cannot represent the latter in the
marketplace. Homogeneity of demand with regard to a single
product is one thing; homogeneity of demand with regard to an
entire series of products is another.112 As discussed above, in a
vertical-boilerplate situation it can be prohibitively hard for the
consumer to reject a single contract or term; one usually either
110. Bakos et al., supra note 109, at 3, 26.
111. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
112. It is possible, however, that increased complexity brings with it
increased, rather than decreased, homogeneity—i.e., that heterogeneity in
individual demand is smoothed out by bundling more products into the
transaction. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text (discussing
bundling). If this is true, then added complexity would not make the informed
minority less able to represent the ignorant majority.
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rejects or accepts the entire transaction.113 Therefore, as more
sellers and features are introduced—i.e., as vertical complexity
increases—the ability to send a signal to the market about a
single product feature (such as a boilerplate term) becomes
increasingly muted.
In the end, then, the informed-minority theory gives us little
reason to be confident in the market’s responsiveness to
consumers’ boilerplate preferences. In theory, a subset of
attentive consumers could serve as a proxy for the inattentive
remainder. But in practice, the empirical evidence points the
other way, and the assumptions on which the informed-minority
argument rests prove far-fetched—even more so once it is applied
to a real-world vertical transaction that involves multiple
adhesion contracts and other indicators of high product
complexity.
B. Reputational Theory
Commentators have also offered a second, separate defense
of boilerplate’s enforceability in the face of seemingly insuperable
information costs: the reputational theory. The gist of the
reputational theory is that it does not matter if boilerplate terms
fail to respond to consumer preferences at the time of contract
formation because, when the opportunity arises to enforce a term
at the tail end of the transaction, sellers waive enforcement and
accommodate the consumer.114
And why would the seller do so? For reputational reasons. It
wants to retain the consumer’s future business and avoid
becoming known for poor customer service.115 Thus boilerplate is
113. Supra Part III.C.1.
114. E.g., POSNER, supra note 8, at 145; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A.
Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 827, 829–31 (2006); Gillette, supra note 7, at 703–12; Robert A. Hillman,
Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 747 (2002); Hillman & Rachlinski,
supra note 8, at 442; Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic
Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation
Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 879 (2006); Rakoff,
supra note 1, at 1221.
115. See sources cited supra note 114.
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not a concern (the argument goes), because even if the market
fails to rid the transaction of unwanted terms ex ante,
reputational concerns will get rid of them ex post.116
If reputational constraints are sufficient to govern the
outcome of disputes, however, why do we need boilerplate at
all?117 The answer that the theory’s proponents give is that a
seller will not always disregard contractual clauses in favor of a
customer service strategy.118 Instead, the seller will enforce
boilerplate selectively, reserving its use for those few
opportunistic consumers who seek to exploit the seller’s “the
customer is always right” instinct—e.g., the conniving buyer who
damages a product and then tries to return it as defective.119 The
boilerplate terms are thus relevant because they form an ex ante

116. See sources cited supra note 114.
117. See Hillman & Barakat, supra note 105, at 12 (“If accepted, the
[reputational] argument means that we do not need contract law at all.”).
Indeed, one well-known study of actual business-to-business practices found
that reputation dominates contracts as the key determinant in dispute
resolution.
Even where the parties have a detailed and carefully planned
agreement which indicates what is to happen if, say, the seller fails to
deliver on time, often they will never refer to the agreement but will
negotiate a solution when the problem arises apparently as if there
had never been any original contract.
Stewart Macaulay, Noncontractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963) [hereinafter Macaulay, Noncontractual
Relations].
118. See sources cited supra note 114.
119. Clay Gillette uses a similar example in Rolling Contracts as an Agency
Problem, supra note 7, at 704; see also Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 114, at
834 (using an example of a hotel guest who checks out late). Some of the theory’s
proponents further explain that, although boilerplate gives sellers an advantage
over consumers, that advantage merely counterbalances an advantage that
consumers have: namely, sellers have a reputation in the marketplace that tells
consumers which sellers to avoid, but consumers have no reputation that tells
sellers which consumers to avoid. Thus there is a need for an ex post contractual
mechanism to weed out the “bad” consumers. Bebchuk & Posner, supra note
114, at 829–30; Gillette, supra note 7, at 704. But see eBay, All About Feedback
Policies, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/feedback-ov.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2013) (describing a feedback system that not only allows eBay buyers to rate
sellers but also allows sellers to rate buyers) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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baseline from which the seller has the ex post discretion to
depart.120
Unlike the informed-minority theory, the reputational theory
neatly solves the problem of information costs, in both their
horizontal and vertical dimensions, because under its approach
boilerplate terms are only enforced against the rare opportunist
who deserves no better. My vertical empirics thus do not directly
speak to the reputational theory. (Indeed, if the theory is true,
there is no boilerplate problem to be solved.) Nevertheless, the
theory fails to survive when evaluated in light of my broader
theme: examining the boilerplate problem from the perspective of
what actually takes place in the real world. When one views the
reputational defense from that perspective, its foundations fall
away; it is revealed to be merely an interesting theory, rather
than a practical justification for enforcing real-world boilerplate
against real-world consumers.
The reputational theory proves unrealistic for three reasons.
First, the theory relies on questionable assumptions about sellers’
ability to differentiate among consumers. For the reputational
dynamic to rescue boilerplate, we must expect a seller to be
unable to distinguish opportunistic buyers ex ante but somehow
be able to distinguish them ex post (because a seller that can
make the distinction ex ante will simply impose different
boilerplate terms on the different types of buyers).121 Both
propositions are problematic. How certain are we that sellers can
accurately identify the consumers who really received defective
products and distinguish them from the opportunists? And how
certain are we that sellers could draw such distinctions at the tail

120. POSNER, supra note 8, at 145 (“[T]he seller’s right to stand on the
contract as written will protect it against opportunistic buyers.”); Johnston,
supra note 114, at 878 (“The key to understanding why a firm can benefit by
allowing its employees to forgive some customers’ contract breaches lies in the
recognition that not all existing customers are worth keeping.”); Rakoff, supra
note 1, at 1221 (“[I]f legal liabilities are set lower than the obligations that the
firm recognizes in its actual practice, the gap can provide room to maneuver in
the face of inevitable adversity.”).
121. See Johnston, supra note 114, at 879 (describing sellers’ ex post
enforcement discretion as “a substitute for ex-ante screening”).
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end of the transaction but not at the front end?122 It seems just as
likely, if not more so, that the presence of one-sided boilerplate
would scare off the “good” customers from even asking for
accommodation.123 Indeed, one reasonable definition of an
opportunistic customer would be someone who hounds sellers for
concessions to which he or she is not legally entitled—which
would imply no accommodation for anyone who bothers to ask.124

122. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1235, 1236 (2006) [hereinafter Rakoff, Sociology of Boilerplate] (stating
that the reputational dynamic will not “lead firms to recognize voluntarily the
supposed legitimate claims of decent consumers” at a volume “congruent
with . . . any known economic measure of an incentive for efficient behavior”); cf.
Bob Sullivan, Discount Cellphone Sites Come with Double Dose of Termination
Fees, Hassles, REDTAPE CHRONICLES (May 8, 2012, 5:11 AM), http://redtape.
msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/05/08/11582479-discount-cellphone-sites-come-withdouble-dose-of-termination-fees-hassles?lite (last visited Feb. 4, 2013)
(recounting a tale of an innocent customer who was not accommodated until the
news bureau got involved) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
123. See Gillette, supra note 7, at 706 (“Sellers may use contract terms in an
in terrorem effort to deter requests for redress, or as an initial response to buyer
complaints.”); Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts
and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory
Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 91 (1997)
(finding that exculpatory clauses in contracts have a deterrent effect on
propensity to seek compensation when they are read); Charles A. Sullivan, The
Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127,
1136 (2010) (explaining that unenforceable provisions in contracts deter
uninformed parties from exercising contractual rights). It may seem odd for
consumers to be scared off by onerous boilerplate terms, given the compelling
evidence that they don’t read boilerplate. But here we are not talking about
reading boilerplate before making the purchase decision; we are talking about
reading it much later, once something has gone wrong. Consumers who do not
read boilerplate when entering into a transaction may well read it later when
the transaction takes a turn for the worse and they need to assess the possibility
of legal recourse.
124. In addition, some empirical research suggests that lower-class
consumers are more likely to view contracts as binding than upper-class
consumers. See Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship
Among Citizenship, Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV.
381, 421–22 (2008) (presenting preliminary findings). If this is true, then the
willingness to seek extracontractual accommodation may depend not just on
whether a consumer is “good” or “bad” but on his or her socioeconomic status—
an unsettling possibility.
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Second, the reputational theory resurrects the employee as
an agent with discretion to negotiate.125 Such employee discretion
contrasts with one of the longstanding justifications for enforcing
boilerplate in the first place, namely the need to avoid the agency
costs of individualized negotiation—e.g., to keep employees from
succumbing too easily to Marshall Field’s “give the lady what she
wants” philosophy.126 Of course, the ex post negotiation that the
reputational theory calls for would occur less frequently, and thus
would arguably impose lower agency costs, than the ex ante
negotiation that would occur if all contracts were individually
bargained. Nevertheless, for the reputational theory to work we
must believe that the benefits of this approach would exceed the
inevitable costs of giving employees the discretion to waive terms
on a case-by-case basis. The theory’s proponents provide no
evidence that this would actually be the case in the real world.
Finally, even if we assume that employees can differentiate
between the good and bad customers, and we zero out the agency
costs (so that the employee invariably acts in the best interests of
the seller), we still must believe that it is in the seller’s best
interests to accommodate the “good” consumer.127 In other words,
sellers may derive reputational benefit from forgoing enforcement
of a boilerplate term, but that benefit comes at a price. For
example, a seller incurs a cost each time it replaces a product. If
125. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 114, at 878–80 (highlighting the
importance of managerial discretion to waive one-sided terms when dealing
with “good, high value customers”).
126. As legend has it, Field—the founder of the eponymous Chicago
department store—uttered this phrase as a rebuke to an employee who was
arguing with a female customer. It soon became the store’s motto. Mark D.
Bauer, “Give The Lady What She Wants”—As Long As It Is Macy’s, 80 TEMP. L.
REV. 949, 950 (2007). Yet it is that very customer service attitude that
boilerplate is meant to protect against. Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation
and the Duty to Read—Business by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and
Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1059 (1966) (warning against employees’
“the customer is always right” attitude); Macaulay, Noncontractual Relations,
supra note 117, at 65 (citing the need to “keep . . . salesmen from making
concessions to the customer”); Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1222–24 (warning against
“wayward sales personnel”). Perhaps that’s why Marshall Field & Co. is no
more. See Bauer, supra note 126, at 950 (revealing that the store is now Macy’s).
127. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 114, at 878–80 (discussing the benefits of
“granting discretionary forgiveness” in loan-repayment agreements in order to
build “profitable, long-term relationships” with “high-value” borrowers).
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it is not contractually obligated to do so, then it will not
accommodate a replacement request, even from a “good”
customer, unless the reputational benefit exceeds that cost.
That cost–benefit calculation involves a daunting number of
unknowns. On the benefit side of the ledger, it assumes that
consumers generate and share meaningful quantities of accurate
reputational information.128 But like any informational asset,
reputation is a nonrival public good; consumers therefore do not
fully internalize the gains from publicizing their experience with
disreputable sellers, which means that such accounts are likely to
be underproduced.129 And even if we ignore the public-goods
problem, sellers may find it more cost-effective to buttress their
reputations through advertising, marketing, and outright
manipulation than through accommodating complaining
customers one by one.130 Indeed, short-term and one-off sellers
128. Although no one has conducted an empirical study of boilerplate that
focuses on the reputational factor, Victoria Plaut and Robert Bartlett found that
associating a click-wrap contract with Google (presumably a company with a
good reputation) had no statistically significant effect on whether consumers
read the contract’s terms. Victoria C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett III, Blind
Consent? A Social Psychological Investigation of Non-Readership of ClickThrough Agreements, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 302, 305 (2012).
129. See Gillette, supra note 7, at 704; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8,
at 447; cf. Rakoff, Sociology of Boilerplate, supra note 122, at 1236 (criticizing
reputation-theory proponents for inter alia “offer[ing] no model of how the
market in reputation works, or of why the values it generates are responsive to
anything other than firms’ fears of how much reputational damage particular
claimants are, for a myriad of possible reasons, in a position to cause”). Gillette
uses the public-goods issue to show that sellers are unlikely to share
information on disreputable consumers, but it applies equally to the sharing of
information by consumers about sellers. See Gillette, supra note 7, at 704.
130. See, e.g., ReputationReset, http://www.reputationreset.com (last visited
Feb. 4, 2013) (“We help clean up the bad [search engine] results, restoring your
reputation and making sure poor reviews, misinformation, or bad-mouthing
competitors no longer hold you back.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The converse situation—websites or search engines that
aggregate information on sellers’ boilerplate—is, like the reputational theory, an
idea that is conceptually appealing but that has found no purchase in the real
world. Bakos et al., supra note 109, at 33–34 (finding it “highly unlikely that
shoppers are, to an important extent, becoming informed about EULA terms by
consulting other online sources”); Ben-Shahar, Opportunity To Read, supra note
103, at 22–25 (evaluating the possibility of rating services for contracts but
finding little hope); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help?
Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software
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probably have little interest in building a reputation through any
means at all.131
On the cost side of the ledger, some contractual prerogatives
may be too valuable to give up, reputational consequences
notwithstanding. For example, one of the most litigated issues in
the world of boilerplate is the consumer class-action waiver.132
Does anyone seriously believe that a seller would ever voluntarily
forgo enforcement of such a clause? In addition, those provisions
that are not too valuable to forgo may come up too infrequently to
have any reputational impact one way or the other, given that
boilerplate terms tend to govern rare contingencies.133
For all these reasons, the reputational theory is too
unreliable to rescue boilerplate from its shortcomings. True, it
identifies a dynamic that might cause a seller to refrain from
enforcing an adhesive term against a consumer. But only if the
planets align in a particular—and particularly unrealistic—way.
The theory falls short of providing support for the general
proposition that allowing unread boilerplate to be enforced at the
whim of the seller is in the public interest.
We are therefore left with a question. If information costs
render the market dysfunctional, and neither the informedminority theory nor the reputational dynamic rescues it from that
dysfunction, what other solutions to the boilerplate problem
exist? For the answer, we turn to Part V.

Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 184 & n.65 (2011) (discussing the
“EULAlyzer” boilerplate analysis program but finding it rarely used).
131. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 444.
132. E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–51
(2011) (upholding consumer class-action waiver against unconscionability
challenge). Moreover, to be truly effective, the waiver of a class-action
prohibition would have to be done on a grand scale, rather than made on a caseby-case basis, because by definition a class action cannot be filed by one
consumer at a time.
133. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 15, at 663 (“[T]he probability of any
single customer being affected by any given contract term is usually quite
small.”); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 443 (noting that “standard
terms cover events that are unlikely to occur”).
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V. Toward Enforceable Boilerplate

We now know that once a transaction reaches a certain level
of complexity, consumers simply will not read boilerplate. The
functioning market that forms the basis for boilerplate’s
enforceability is thus largely an illusion, particularly when one
considers the full verticality of the transactions that consumers
encounter in the real world. No informed minority rescues
nonreading consumers. And reputational concerns will not
reliably constrain sellers from enforcing the boilerplate.
So where do we go from here? In the following discussion, I
first review the two solutions at the extreme: enforcing no
boilerplate and enforcing all of it. I then suggest a pair of
solutions that fall in between the extremes. The first of the two is
the more conventional in that it operates within existing
unconscionability doctrine, but it reforms the doctrine using
insights from the verticality approach. The second is my more
radical, “forced salience” mechanism, which makes sellers and
consumers alike confront boilerplate’s information costs—and, by
confronting them, minimize them.
A. Two Extremes
1. Get Rid of All Boilerplate
The most extreme solution to the boilerplate problem would
be to refuse to allow sellers to even include boilerplate in any
transaction of minimal complexity, or at least to declare it all
unenforceable. Given the evidence of market failure, this
approach is not as crazy as it first sounds. Yet it goes too far
because even a one-sided boilerplate term is sometimes efficient.
When that’s the case, undoing a term would be worse than
preserving it.
To understand why some one-sided boilerplate is worth
preserving, one must appreciate that boilerplate presents an
example of the classic market for lemons.134 Although consumers
134. For the original conception of the lemons theory, see George A. Akerlof,
The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84

VERTICAL BOILERPLATE

213

do not usually consider boilerplate terms when making a
purchase, they do pay attention to other features of the product;
indeed, the whole point of satisficing is that certain features are
ignored so that others can be considered. So some features (such
as price, presumably) will be salient even though others (such as
boilerplate) will not. Thus the lemons problem: sellers will
decrease the quality of the nonsalient features and use the
resulting savings to make the salient features more attractive.135
Boilerplate, as a nonsalient feature, will accordingly be full of
terms that reduce seller costs and shift risks to consumers, and
sellers will use the money they save to lower the price of the
product.136 Commentators have observed this dynamic in the
adhesive contract terms that accompany products as diverse as
cell-phone plans,137 bank accounts,138 and credit cards,139 and
some empirics for the software industry lend support to its
presence as well.140
If the lemons effect consistently shifts boilerplate’s costs and
risks to consumers, without any informed consent on their part,
why would boilerplate ever be worth preserving? The answer is
that sometimes consumers can bear those costs and risks more
Q.J. ECON. 488, 488–500 (1970). For those who first applied it to boilerplate, see
Beales et al., supra note 95, at 510–11; Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 244 & n.158
For the most thorough explanation of boilerplate’s lemons dynamic, see
Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1206.
135. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1206 (“[M]arket competition actually will
force sellers to provide low-quality non-salient attributes in order to save costs
that will be passed along to buyers in the form of lower prices.”).
136. Id.
137. Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Mobile Misperceptions, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 49, 52–53 (2009).
138. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 244.
139. Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1401–02
(2004). For Bar-Gill, the nonsalience of credit-card terms is rooted in behavioral
biases, rather than in information costs, but the effect is the same: consumers
routinely discount certain features of the transaction, which gives sellers an
incentive to reduce their quality so as to improve the more salient features. Id.
at 1400–01.
140. Marotta-Wurgler, Empirical Analysis, supra note 6, at 680 (studying
647 software contracts from 598 different companies and 114 distinct markets
and finding that they were “almost without exception tilted toward the seller,
relative to the relevant default rules—some sharply so”).
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efficiently than sellers. As Russell Korobkin explains, a “low
quality” boilerplate term (i.e., a term that favors sellers over
consumers) is not necessarily an inefficient one.141 There are
some pro-seller terms to which a fully informed consumer would
want to agree because the resulting savings in price would be
greater than the cost of the term to the consumer.142 For example,
a software company might realize substantial savings if it could
contractually limit installation of its programs to one computer
per customer. Such a term would arguably be “low quality,” in
that it constrains consumers,143 but many consumers might
nevertheless be happy to accept it because they never planned to
install the program on multiple machines and so can pay a lower
price without giving up much in return.
In short, if a term is efficient, it should be enforced whether
it emerges by sheer luck from a dysfunctional market for lemons
or by design from a functioning market with robust competition
and universal salience of product features. The alternative is to
allow consumers to have their cake and eat it too—i.e., to enjoy
the lower price but then escape enforcement of the term. Faced
with that possibility, sellers would change the boilerplate to
allocate such risks to themselves, inefficiently, and charge higher
prices to make up for it.144 Such an outcome would do no favors
for seller or consumer.
141. Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1283. Korobkin also points out that the
lemons effect can hurt sellers as well as consumers because it prevents sellers
from competing on nonsalient features. Id. at 1206. Indeed, the main
contribution of the lemons theory is to show how high-quality products are
driven out of the marketplace whenever quality is not salient. See Akerlof, supra
note 134, at 489–90 (explaining the lemons theory through the market for used
cars).
142. See Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1222 (“[C]osts saved by shifting risks to the
customer via form terms may well be returned to the customer by means of
lower prices.”).
143. Query whether copyright law already provides that constraint in
17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006), which forbids unauthorized reproduction of
copyrighted works. But consumers might have a defense in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair
use doctrine) or 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (limited usage license for owner of
computer program).
144. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1213 (explaining that, if courts would
refuse to enforce market-efficient terms, “the majority of resulting contracts
would be inefficient and the majority of buyers made worse off”).
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2. Enforce All Boilerplate
The solution at the other extreme is to enforce all boilerplate,
information costs or not, because we can’t do without it. This is a
common response of boilerplate’s defenders to the information
cost problem; they admit its shortcomings but nonetheless insist
on its inevitability, under the assumption that transactions
cannot proceed unless they are governed by reams of unread
contracts. Eric Posner—one of ProCD’s few champions in the
legal academy—bases his support for the case on such an
argument: “Contracts are long and detailed by necessity. To sell
goods, manufacturers need to be able to put just the crucial terms
on the box (such as the price) along with useful information, and
to omit information of little use to consumers, including obvious
information.”145 And Judge Easterbrook, the author of ProCD,
envisions only two possible worlds: one in which consumers pay
now but get the terms later, and another in which cashiers read
pages of contracts to customers before ringing up sales, in a
“droning voice [that] would anesthetize rather than enlighten
many potential buyers.”146
This insistence on boilerplate’s importance is overblown.
Consider my Toshiba computer purchase. If all 96,641 words of
boilerplate disappeared from that transaction, the heavens would
not fall. Instead, default rules would fill in the blanks, and the
transaction would proceed with surprisingly little disruption. In
place of Toshiba customer service contracts, I would have an
implied warranty of merchantability and express warranties
based on statements Toshiba made about its goods.147 In place of
145. Posner, supra note 27, at 1183.
146. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Easterbrook, J.).
147. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977) (implied warranty of merchantability); id. § 2313 (express warranties). Note that the warranty of merchantability allows for
some variation in the quality of goods and that the generally accepted practice
in the relevant industry is a major factor in determining merchantability. See
Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 752 F. Supp. 181, 191 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(“Acceptance in the trade . . . has long been a reliable barometer for determining
whether a particular product is merchantable.”), aff’d in relevant part, rev’d in
irrelevant part, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). Therefore, given the bugs that one
encounters as a matter of course when dealing with computers, one would not
expect the warranty to have much force. For example, the Step-Saver court held
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Microsoft’s licenses, I would rely on the Copyright Act’s limited
grant of user privileges to software purchasers.148 Instead of
arbitrating various disputes with sellers, I would use the court
system. And so forth.
This is not to say that a transaction can always proceed if the
associated contracts disappear. To the contrary, in some
instances contractual terms are essential, and getting rid of them
would accordingly mean getting rid of the entire transaction. For
example, no default rule will be able to tell me how soon I must
return my rental car; a specific contractual term would be
needed. Such essential terms, however, are generally not hidden
in boilerplate. Rather, they tend to be presented up front, in a
salient context, often with an array of options from which the
consumer is forced to consciously choose. No one rents a car
without having made a deliberate choice about the rental period.
Or consider my computer purchase, in which the website walked
me through the options for a number of important features, both
contractual (shipping terms, service plan, extended warranty)
and noncontractual (monitor, memory, size of hard drive). None
of these web pages presented me with any boilerplate, and none
of them was included in the boilerplate tally. Getting rid of the
boilerplate would thus not have destroyed the transaction.149
The prospect of unenforceable boilerplate does, however,
draw attention to the importance of formulating appropriate
default rules to fill the gap that unenforceable boilerplate would
leave. The traditional view of default rules holds that they merely
insert into the contract whatever term the parties would most
likely have negotiated themselves—i.e., the efficient term.150
that computer hardware’s incompatibility with popular software did not violate
the merchantability standard. Id. The software programs in question included
WordPerfect (which qualified as popular back in the early 1990s despite its
near-moribund existence today).
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a).
149. Cf. Preston & McCann, supra note 71, at 9 (commenting on ProCD by
observing that “the seven-by-nine-by-three-inch box in which software is sold
would provide plenty of space if the terms were limited to the reasonable
number of terms necessary to protect intellectual property written in plain
English”).
150. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 8, at 120 (calling for gap-filling default
rules that “mimic the terms that the parties would have incorporated”); Frank
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Modern scholarship, however, has revealed that substituting an
inefficient term can sometimes be better because it forces a party
to reveal welfare-enhancing information.151 Attractive as that
prospect might be in some cases, it is exactly the wrong approach
to take for boilerplate terms because the whole point of the
boilerplate problem is that consumers already have more
information than they can deal with.152 This suggests that when
the possibility of unenforceable boilerplate is significant, the
applicable default rule should be formulated based on the
traditional gap-filling theory. Otherwise, we end up with the
worst of both worlds: an unenforceable contract term displaced by
an inefficient default rule.
In short, getting rid of all boilerplate is too extreme, but so is
preserving all boilerplate. Therefore, the correct legal solution
must appreciate that some boilerplate is good for consumers, even
if produced by a dysfunctional market, and that doing away with
boilerplate will not necessarily explode the transaction, as long as
the law remains attentive to filling the resulting gap with
appropriate default rules. With those caveats in mind, let us turn
to a pair of more promising solutions to the boilerplate problem.

H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1433 (1989) (calling for gap-filling default rules that “duplicate the terms
the parties would have selected”); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The
Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69
VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (calling for gap-filling default rules that “mimic the
agreements contracting parties would reach were they costlessly to bargain out
each detail of the transaction”).
151. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97–100 (1989)
(discussing penalty default rules and arguing that inefficient default contract
terms should be enforced against the party that possesses more information,
thus encouraging both information sharing and explicit “contract[ing] around”
the inefficient rules). Ayres and Gertner also discuss using defaults to
incentivize the sharing of information with third parties, such as courts, rather
than with the other contracting party. Id. at 95–98. Those defaults are less
relevant here.
152. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing consumers’ cognitive limitations and
the problem of information overload).
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B. Two In-Betweens

Having rejected the solutions at the two extremes, let us now
consider two approaches in between. The first is to use verticality
to adjust contract law’s well-known approach to adhesion
contracts—namely, the unconscionability doctrine—so as to
better contextualize its inquiry and properly allocate its burdens
of proof. The second is to directly require sellers to lower the
information costs that their boilerplate imposes, both by making
it more salient and by reducing its overall volume.
1. Unconscionability
When concerns about boilerplate arise, contract law turns to
the unconscionability doctrine.153 The unconscionability analysis
focuses on whether there were defects in the bargaining process
(procedural unconscionability) and on whether the resulting
contract contains grossly one-sided terms (substantive
unconscionability).154 Some courts will invalidate a contract only
153. To be sure, there are other applicable doctrines, such as the “reasonable
expectations” doctrine, see, e.g., Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 406, 414
(N.J. 1985) (ruling that consent to an insurance contract “can be inferred only to
the extent that the policy language conforms to public expectations and
commercially reasonable standards”), and the Restatement’s rule for
standardized agreements, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3)
(1981) (“Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting
such assent would not do so if he knew that the [standardized] writing
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.”). But as
Russell Korobkin points out, both doctrines suffer from infirmities similar to
those of unconscionability, and in any event, they “appear to have been almost
completely forgotten by courts, at least outside of the realm of insurance
contracts.” Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1270–71. In any event, to the extent that
these doctrines remain appealing, they can easily be folded into my substantive
unconscionability proposal.
154. The distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability
originated in Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (referring to “bargaining
naughtiness as ‘procedural unconscionability’” and to “evils in the resulting
contract as ‘substantive unconscionability’”) and has become a staple of the case
law. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir.
2003) (discussing Ohio law); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (not using the terms “procedural” and
“substantive,” but explaining that “[u]nconscionability has generally been
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when they find both kinds of unconscionability,155 whereas others
are satisfied with just one of the two subcategories.156 The
following proposal requires proof of both but makes a small
adjustment to procedural unconscionability and a bigger
adjustment to substantive unconscionability. In combination,
these changes would go a long way toward addressing the
infirmities in the way contract law approaches boilerplate.
Start with procedural unconscionability. As Russell Korobkin
points out, the procedural inquiry asks whether the allegedly
unconscionable term was presented in such a way as to attract
the reader’s attention—was it on the first page? was it in
boldface?157—but ignores the fact that cognitively overburdened
consumers might fail to process even a prominent term.158 In
contrast, Korobkin observes, a better procedural unconscionability
analysis would not be satisfied with examining whether a
boilerplate term was prominent, but would instead directly address
whether it was salient to consumers as a class.159
What does verticality add to this conversation? Context. In
order to determine whether a term is truly salient, courts must
look beyond the four corners of the contract itself and consider
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
other party”).
155. See, e.g., Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 828
(N.Y. 1988) (“A determination of unconscionability generally requires that a
contract was both procedurally and substantially unconscionable when
made . . . .”).
156. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995)
(concluding that “a claim of unconscionability can be established with a showing
of substantive unconscionability alone”).
157. See, e.g., Russell v. Performance Toyota, Inc., 826 So. 2d 719, 726 (Miss.
2002) (enforcing an arbitration clause “preceded by boldface and capitalized
headings”); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Leggett, 744 So. 2d 890, 895–98 (Ala.
1999) (enforcing an arbitration clause appearing in upper-case letters in the
“boxed-in” part of a contract).
158. Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1272–73. Procedural unconscionability has
other failings as well. See id. at 1258–68. Most relevant here, however, is its
overly narrow emphasis on prominence of the term at issue.
159. See id. at 1279–83 (arguing that salience is the key feature of
procedural unconscionability and calling for courts to “initially inquire into
whether a challenged term is salient or non-salient” prior to “considering the
possibility of invalidating a form contract term”).
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the entire transaction from start to finish, with all its information
costs. A term may be unresponsive to market forces,
notwithstanding its prominence, if it arrives after the consumer
has invested considerable time in the purchase (the acquisition
cost issue) or has concentrated his or her limited attention on
other product features (the processing cost issue). And a term
that is not prominent may nonetheless be salient if it is an
important part of the transaction, regardless of how
inconspicuous it seems in the abstract.
Requiring courts to relax their focus on the particular text of
the boilerplate and account for the big picture is not a radical
change, and in fact is consistent with the rhetoric of procedural
unconscionability jurisprudence. The consumer’s “age, education,
intelligence, [and] business acumen and experience” are all
relevant, at least in theory, to the procedural issue,160 as is the
“commercial setting, purpose, and effect” of the contract.161 The
law thus already calls for a contextualization of sorts. Yet in
practice, factors like age and setting are difficult to weigh with
any certainty, which is why courts tend to give them lip service
and then focus on the text of the contract itself. Measuring
boilerplate’s information costs, however, is much easier; evidence
of word count, late-arriving terms, and related factors should be
readily available to consumer and seller alike, and courts can
evaluate that evidence in light of the emerging empirical findings
on consumers’ cognitive limitations when dealing with
boilerplate.162
160. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 837 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)); accord
Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 504 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Morrison,
317 F.3d at 666); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449
& n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (stating that lack of education and “ignorance of
arithmetic” are factors a court should consider); Layne v. Garner, 612 So. 2d
404, 408 (Ala. 1992) (examining whether a party is “unsophisticated and/or
uneducated”).
161. Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512 (Cal. 1985).
162. Korobkin would place the burden of proving nonsalience on the party
that wishes to invalidate the term because all salient terms and some
nonsalient terms are efficient. Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1280. Given the
mounting evidence that boilerplate goes unread by nearly everyone, this should
not be a particularly hard burden to bear. The key issue, then, is not who should
bear the burden of proving procedural unconscionability; the question is
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This simple expedient of adding vertical context to the
analysis would result in more frequent findings of procedural
unconscionability. But it would not upend boilerplate entirely.
When information costs were low, as in the purchase of a
straightforward product accompanied by a short contract, then
the law would expect consumers to read the terms and register
their individual preferences. Enforceability would merely scale
with overall transactional complexity—and appropriately so.
Next, consider substantive unconscionability. Context is an
important but overlooked factor here as well. A term may appear
one-sided in isolation, but if the seemingly oppressed party got
something more valuable in return (e.g., a significant price
reduction), then invalidating the term would upset an efficient
bargain. The inverse is also true: a term that appears reasonable
on its face may in fact be oppressive if one party unilaterally
imposed it on the other with no concomitant benefit.163 In short,
by examining terms in isolation, rather than in the overall
bargaining context, substantive unconscionability fails to weigh
the costs and benefits of the transaction as a whole.164
As Korobkin has pointed out, a better substantive
unconscionability inquiry would focus not on whether the term at
issue imposes a cost on the consumer, or on how high that cost is,
but on whether imposing that cost on the consumer is efficient—
whether it increases the parties’ joint wealth.165 As we saw in the
lemons discussion above, unread boilerplate shifts costs to
consumers as a matter of course, but such shifting is welfareenhancing only when the consumer is the party better able to
bear the risk. Therefore, to determine whether the term is “fair”
to the consumer (as the substantive unconscionability analysis
whether courts will come to understand that such proof requires a more holistic
view of the transaction, in all its complexity.
163. See Baird, supra note 10, at 939 (“Advantage-taking through fine print
is still advantage-taking, even if the stakes are small.”).
164. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1273–74 (calling the courts’ failure to
conduct a true cost–benefit analysis “the glaring flaw in substantive
unconscionability jurisprudence”).
165. See id. at 1283 (“[A]s part of their ‘substantive unconscionability’
analysis, courts should examine whether the benefits of a low-quality term to
the seller in the form of savings in production, distribution, and sales costs
exceed the value of an alternative term to potential buyers.”).
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purports to do), one must determine which party can most
cheaply bear the risk being shifted.166
Courts rarely make this determination, but there are
exceptions. For example, the court in A&M Produce Co. v. FMC
Corp.167 evaluated a disclaimer of all warranties for agricultural
equipment. Noting that “risk of loss is most appropriately borne
by the party best able to prevent its occurrence,” the court ruled
that the disclaimer was substantively unconscionable,
determining that the seller could bear the risk of its own
equipment’s failings more efficiently than the inexperienced
buyer.168
Granted, a cost–benefit analysis of this sort can be difficult.
Even when a court knows that a boilerplate term is nonsalient,
and has therefore already found procedural unconscionability, it
will often be unclear whether a boilerplate term’s imposition of
costs or risks on the consumer is efficient.169 This means that the
outcome will often depend on which party bears the burden of
proof.
Korobkin suggests that the consumer should bear this
burden (i.e., should have to prove that a boilerplate term is
inefficient) because he is concerned that efficient terms might
otherwise be thrown out—the danger of false positives.170 Here,
however, Korobkin and I disagree. Assigning burdens of proof
generally is a function of two factors: (1) the probability of the
event to be proved and (2) which party has better access to the

166. Id. at 1283–84.
167. A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982), cited in Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1277.
168. A&M Produce Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125 (“Rarely would the buyer be in
a better position than the manufacturer-seller to evaluate the performance
characteristics of a machine.”).
169. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1274–76 (revealing the complexities of
such an inquiry through examples of arbitration clauses); cf. PUBLIC CITIZEN,
THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 2
(2007) (arguing that credit-card arbitration agreements disfavor consumers).
170. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1285 (calling for an “implicit
presumption against invalidating terms”).
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relevant evidence.171 Regarding the first factor, we simply do not
know how frequently boilerplate contains inefficient terms.
Korobkin is certainly right that there is a danger of false
positives if sellers bear the admittedly difficult burden of proving
efficiency.172 But there is a danger of false negatives if the
consumer bears the burden of proving inefficiency, and it is
impossible to know which danger is greater.173
Given this uncertainty, the better basis for assignment of the
burden is to look to the second factor: which party has better
access to evidence about the matter to be proved?174 In the
boilerplate context, that party is the seller. After all, the seller is
the party that drafted the term in question, and of the two parties
it is the only one that fully internalizes the boilerplate’s
information costs. So the seller presumably had a reason for
allocating costs and risks as it did. If the reason is that the
chosen allocation increases the parties’ joint wealth, then the
seller can so demonstrate. If, however, the reason is that the
lemons dynamic forced it to inefficiently offload costs on the
consumer through nonsalient means, then forcing the seller to
prove efficiency not only leads to the correct result in the case at
hand, but it also helps solve the lemons problem going forward
and thus increases overall market efficiency.
In sum, two changes to the unconscionability doctrine can
help remedy the problems with boilerplate that this Article has
identified. First, as always, the consumer must prove procedural
unconscionability by showing that the disputed term was not
171. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (John W. Strong gen’l ed., 5th ed.
1999); Bruce L. Hay and Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation:
An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 413, 418–19 (1997).
172. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1285 (arguing that false positives occur
because courts have difficulty weighing “industry-wide benefits and costs in the
context of an individual dispute”).
173. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 827 (“[I]n the context of civil liability,
there is no reason to prefer one danger over the other.”).
174. JAMES FLEMING JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 344 (4th ed. 1992) (“The
burden of proof traditionally is placed on the party having the readier access to
knowledge about the fact in question.”); MCCORMICK, supra note 171, § 337 (“A
doctrine often repeated by the courts is that where the facts with regard to an
issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party has the burden of
proving the issue.”).
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salient—but this inquiry should take into account emerging
empirical evidence and the full context of the overall transaction.
Second, if the consumer satisfies this burden, then the burden on
the issue of substantive unconscionability shifts to the seller, who
must show that the term was efficient. Failure to do so means the
term is unenforceable.
2. Forced Salience
Changing the unconscionability doctrine is an attractive
approach to the boilerplate problem, not least because it works
within an existing and familiar contract law construct. Its
application, however, is likely to be infrequent because an
unconscionability analysis arises only in those rare instances in
which the parties have begun suing each other. In addition, its
effect will be indirect because it encourages, rather than explicitly
requires, boilerplate to be responsive to the market.
Is there a more direct and universal approach to boilerplate’s
information costs problem—one that would fix the marketplace
rather than supplant it? Consider again the two aspects of the
information costs problem: the acquisition cost and the processing
cost. Reducing acquisition cost is a matter of making the
boilerplate more immediately accessible to consumers, such as
through a disclosure requirement, so that they are better able to
make a rational decision.175 Yet even when the acquisition cost is
reduced to zero—i.e., even when the adhesive terms are readily

175. A number of commentators have accordingly suggested solving the
boilerplate problem through early, mandatory disclosure. See, e.g., Braucher,
Decision to Trust the Courts, supra note 29, at 755–56 (criticizing “the practice
of holding back terms for mass-market products . . . even when it would be easy
to provide them in advance” and arguing that “[t]he customer has a right to
know what the product is before deciding whether to order it); Braucher,
Delayed Disclosure, supra note 78, at 1860–62 (calling for “require[d] disclosure
of key terms in software licenses,” and presenting data that only 12.5% of
surveyed software companies disclosed their license agreement prior to
requiring payment online); Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending
Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 95, 104 (2011) (describing
mandatory disclosure as a “safe harbor” for sellers).
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available—consumers still face the processing cost, which in a
complex transaction can pose just as big a problem.176
Requiring early disclosure is therefore not enough; it is a
necessary but not sufficient part of the solution whenever the
transaction as a whole is complex enough to impose considerable
information processing costs. Any solution must also reduce
processing costs. And until scientists develop a way to improve
human cognition, processing costs are going to remain a function
of the total amount of information presented.177 There is,
however, a regulatory approach that would lower both acquisition
and processing costs, and it is revealed by examining the
verticality of the computer purchase described above.
The computer purchases involved plenty of product features,
both contractual and noncontractual, that were not presented as
take-it-or-leave-it propositions. For example, the Dell website
guided me through an array of options on such matters as the
amount of memory, size of the hard drive, shipping terms, inhome service plan, and extended warranty—with one web page
dedicated to each such feature. Indeed, the website all but forced
me to choose between those options, with corresponding costs or
savings depending on the choices I made.178
176. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980)
(“Meaningful disclosure does not mean more disclosure. Rather, it describes a
balance between ‘competing considerations of complete disclosure . . . and the
need to avoid . . . [informational overload.]’” (alterations in original) (quoting S.
REP. NO. 96-73, at 3 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 280, 281)); BenShahar & Schneider, supra note 41, at 688 (noting that “incomplete disclosure
leaves people ignorant, but complete disclosure creates crushing overload
problems”). Indeed, relying on disclosure as the sole solution to the information
costs problem actually makes things worse because it blinds courts to the
processing problem and prompts them to enforce any disclosed term, no matter
how nonsalient it may be. See Hillman, supra note 1, at 839 (noting that
increased disclosure “may backfire . . . because it may not increase reading or
shopping for terms or motivate businesses to draft reasonable ones, but instead,
may make heretofore suspect terms more likely enforceable”).
177. See Korobkin, supra note 1, at 1246 (“[C]ontractual inefficiency results
primarily from suboptimal information processing rather than from incomplete
information.”).
178. I was not literally forced to go through each and every feature because
there was a “Finish[] Personalizing” option on each screen that would have
skipped right to the order confirmation process—although even then I would
have had to make choices with regard to terms such as shipping and payment.
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Suppose that the law required Dell to force me to review all
the contractual terms this way, rather than just the very few that
it deemed worthy of inclusion up front? By making me confront
each term before submitting any payment, Dell would be solving
the information acquisition problem. And by not allowing me to
skip the boilerplate, Dell would at least be increasing the odds
that my attention would focus on the transaction’s contractual
features, thus addressing the information processing problem.179
One can imagine more or less intrusive versions of this
requirement. For example, the law could merely require
consumers to click “I agree” with regard to each individual
contract term. Or the law could require sellers to offer options
with real consequences (in terms of costs or savings) and force
consumers to select among them. Those approaches, however,
would likely produce little real increase in salience; a consumer
overloaded with information would just mindlessly click through,
selecting options without really making choices.180 Information
acquisition would occur, but information processing would not.
More effective would be to require the website to really force
the consumer to read—e.g., by scrolling the text line by line, at a
slow speed, or otherwise preventing the consumer from advancing
to the next term until a set period of time had elapsed.181 This
approach, which I call “forced salience,” helps solve the
boilerplate problem in two ways. The most obvious is that by
presenting each term up front and making the consumer confront
179. There is some empirical evidence that offering a consumer options can
increase the rate of acceptance of a contract. E.g., Plaut & Bartlett, supra note
128, at 305.
180. See Hillman & Barakat, supra note 105, at 26 (speculating that “extra
clicking would be cumbersome for little gain because consumers would simply
click without digesting the disclaimer”); Hillman & O’Rourke, supra note 175, at
108 (considering a requirement that consumers click “I agree” but deciding that
it “ultimately may not promote any additional reading anyway”); Korobkin,
supra note 1, at 1246 (dismissing the “specific assent requirement”).
181. One might combine this approach with a “plain English” requirement,
so that the now unavoidable boilerplate could actually be comprehended.
Masson and Waldron had some success in increasing consumer comprehension
through simplified diction and sentence structure. See Masson & Waldron,
supra note 84, at 71–72, 75–76 (finding a significant increase in study
participants’ ability to answer questions and correctly paraphrase prepositional
phrases after reading the “plain-language” version of a contract).
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it before moving on, it directly seeks to reduce the costs of
information acquisition and information processing.182 If this
results in compensatory consumer decisionmaking, great; the
boilerplate problem is solved and the market properly registers
the consumer’s preferences.
But would forced salience really result in significantly more
reading of boilerplate? Perhaps not. Even if reading did not
increase, however, this approach would address the boilerplate
problem in a second, more subtle way. Consider that, as a
consumer, your first reaction to forced salience is probably to
scream in horror at the prospect of sitting through all of that
boilerplate. It’s the digital equivalent of Judge Easterbrook’s
“droning voice” that would “anesthetize rather than enlighten.”183
Yet this seeming liability is in fact an asset because, by adding
new costs—i.e., time and frustration—to each contract term in
the transaction, forced salience effectively imposes a tax on
bloated boilerplate.184 Sellers know that consumers have limited
time, limited cognitive abilities, and low thresholds for
182. Empirics suggest that reducing the length of click-wrap contracts
increases comprehension and may increase readership. See Plaut & Bartlett,
supra note 128, at 302–04 (finding 11% overall comprehension increase in all
test contracts, but finding significant increase in readership time in only two of
the six contracts). Reducing length also increases the likelihood that the
consumer will reject the contract, suggesting that some expression of
preferences due to increased comprehension might be occurring. See id. at 304–
05 (suggesting that shorter contracts most likely allowed study participants to
understand and analyze the terms). Note, however, that the contracts being
tested by Plaut and Bartlett were associated with a free product. See id. at 301
(registering for and using online music website). Such contracts tend to have
more readers than priced products. See Bakos et al., supra note 109, at 34
(pointing out that “consumers may fear that there is a ‘catch’ in products offered
for free”).
183. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Easterbrook, J.).
184. Indeed, if one was interested only in this aspect of the forced salience
approach, one could achieve it directly by taxing each word of boilerplate.
(Thanks to Fred Yen for pointing this out.) One might also view forced salience
as a classic formality, a “check against inconsiderate action,” which focuses
parties’ attention on the legal consequences of their actions. See Baird, supra
note 10, at 944 (“It is much cheaper to sign a document than to melt wax and
use a signet ring. But this is the point.”); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941) (describing formalities’ “cautionary
function”).
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frustration. This means that sellers will respond to a forced
salience requirement by reducing the overall volume of contract
terms to the bare minimum, thus reducing information overload
and increasing the chances that the remaining terms can truly be
processed.185
In other words, forced salience makes consumers confront the
reality of boilerplate’s information costs, and the result is that
sellers can no longer lade the transaction with as much
boilerplate as they please. Instead, sellers will have to make a
call about how badly they want each term to be part of the
transaction. The inevitable paring of boilerplate to its essentials,
and the resulting reduction in sheer volume of terms, would serve
to make it easier for consumers to process those terms that
survive. Even when forced salience fails, it succeeds.
Forced salience is an admittedly radical solution to the
boilerplate problem. This Article has demonstrated, however,
that the problem itself is radical and is radically
underappreciated. Taking half-hearted measures will not restore
integrity to so dysfunctional a market. Forcing the market to
confront its dysfunction will.
VI. Conclusion
Consumers do not encounter boilerplate in the abstract. They
encounter it in the course of real-world transactions. And in the
real world, the information costs of boilerplate loom large.
This Article has accordingly presented the results of a firstever study of the information costs that boilerplate imposes on
185. One might also seek to reduce complexity to more manageable levels by
regulating the noncontractual features of a transaction and their associated
information costs. In a sense, the law already does so through product liability,
false advertising law, and similar consumer-oriented regulation. But contractual
features are a low-hanging fruit; it is comparatively simple to reduce complexity
by declaring a contract term unenforceable—or at least that is the sort of
regulation in which the law routinely engages. It is a much different proposition
to reduce complexity through regulation of noncontractual product features (for
example, requiring computer vendors to offer hard drives in only one size or a
set number of USB ports). See Grether et al., supra note 10, at 289 (“[T]o limit
the number of products that firms could sell or the number of attributes that
products could have would require a costly, complex regulatory process.”).
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consumers as they make their way through an actual
transaction—a fully contextualized, vertical experience. Its
findings are that, in a typical computer purchase, those costs are
so high as to be insuperable. They loom so large that real-world
consumers have little choice but to disregard boilerplate entirely.
The solution to the information cost problem is neither to
forbid all use of boilerplate nor to permit its indiscriminate use.
Instead, the key lies in appreciating that, just as a contextualized
analysis reveals the full scope of the problem, so can a
contextualized solution solve it. The proper regulatory
approaches thus involve changing existing contract doctrine to
take into account the informational challenges that boilerplate
actually presents, or incentivizing market actors to confront those
costs and, by doing so, minimize them.
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VII: Appendix A—Summary of Results
186

Table 1: Summary of Results
No. of Words . . .

Seller
Acer
Dell
HP
Toshiba
Total
Total
Unique
Raw
Average
Weighted
Average

186.
63.

No. of
Contracts
12
29
25
27

...
overall
33,128
78,203
79,340
96,641

. . . at
purchase
9,135
9,765
0
18,678

. . . at
computer
startup
23,993
24,165
24,328
34,744

. . . at
program
startup
0
44,273
55,012
43,219

93

287,312

37,578

107,230

142,504

56

161,767

39,065
[24.1%]

38,225
[23.6%]

84,477
[52.2%]

23.25

71,828

9,394

26,807

35,626

91.7

74,897

7,698
[10.3%]

25,911
[34.6%]

41,286
[55.1%]

93.2

24.75

...
per $
47.1
84.7
103.4
131.5

Weighted averages are based on the market share set forth supra note
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VIII: APPENDIX B—BOILERPLATE BREAKDOWN

Acer

ACER PURCHASE
Contract
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Microsoft

8
9
10
11
12

Title
Standard Terms of Sale
Limited Warranty Agreement
Legal
Products & Services
Privacy
Contacts
End User License Agreement
Acer Subtotal:

Word
Count
3,005
3,353
665
136
1,972
4
1,487
10,622

When
Encountered?
At purchase
At purchase
Incorporated in 1
Incorporated in 3
Incorporated in 1
Incorporated in 5
Computer startup
7 contracts

5,115

Computer startup

784
14,872

Incorporated in 8
Incorporated in 8

429

Incorporated in 10

1,306

Incorporated in 10

License Terms, Windows 7 Home
Premium
Windows 7 Privacy Statement
Windows 7 Privacy Supplement
.NET Framework Benchmark
Testing Terms
Privacy Statement for the Microsoft
Error Reporting Service
Microsoft Subtotal:

22,506

5 contracts

ACER PURCHASE TOTAL

33,128

12 contracts

Word
Count
2,339
700
1,077
5,649

When
Encountered?
At purchase
Incorporated in 1
Incorporated in 1
Incorporated in 1

DELL PURCHASE
Contract
No.
1
2
3
4

Dell

5
6
7
8
9
10

Title
Terms and Conditions of Sale
Return Policy
Site Terms
Warranties
Notice for Dell End User Software
License Agreement
Software License Agreement
DataSafe Online: Terms and
Conditions
Privacy Policy
Change of Address/Request
Catalog/Mailing List Removal
Security
Dell Subtotal:

78

Computer startup

1,581

Computer startup;
incorporated in 7

2,799

DataSafe startup

1,665

Incorporated in 7

256

Incorporated in 8

1,051
17,195

Incorporated in 8
10 contracts

[Dell Purchase continued on next page]
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DELL PURCHASE

Contract
No.

22

Service Agreement

10,444

23
24

Online Privacy Statement
Anti-Spam Policy
Authorized 3rd Party Software and
Services
Microsoft Subtotal:

4,614
464

Incorporated in 19
Internet Explorer
startup;
Incorporated in 19
Incorporated in 22
Incorporated in 22

130

Incorporated in 22

12
13
14
15

Microsoft

16
17
18
19
20

25

Adobe

When
Encountered?

21

11

McAfee

Word
Count
5,115

Title
License Terms, Windows 7 Home
Premium
Windows 7 Privacy Statement
Windows 7 Privacy Supplement
.NET Framework Benchmark
Testing Terms
Privacy Statement for the Microsoft
Error Reporting Service
Software License Terms—Office
2010 Desktop Application Software
Genuine Microsoft Software
Program Privacy Statement
Privacy Statement for Office 2010
Use of Microsoft Copyrighted
Content
Privacy Supplement for Office
Starter
Trademark Guidelines

26
27
28

29

Warranty Disclaimer and Software
License Agreement
Online Privacy Policy
Adobe.com Opt-Out page
Adobe Subtotal:

End User License Agreement

784
14,872
429
1,306
2,819
911

Computer startup
Incorporated in 11
Incorporated in 11
Incorporated in 11
Incorporated in 13
Office Starter
startup
Incorporated in 16

4,994
1,628

Incorporated in 16
Incorporated in 16
and 22

455

Incorporated in 18

47

49,012
3,438
4,551
201
8,190

3,806

15 contracts
Reader startup
Incorporated in 26
Incorporated in 27
3 contracts

Anti-Virus startup

McAfee Subtotal:

3,806

1 contract

DELL PURCHASE TOTAL

78,203

29 contracts
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HP

HP PURCHASE
Contract
No.

Title

Word
Count

1

End User License Agreement
HP Subtotal:

2
3
4
5
6
Microsoft

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Adobe

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

License Terms, Windows 7 Home
Premium
Windows 7 Privacy Statement
Windows 7 Privacy Supplement
.NET Framework Benchmark
Testing Terms
Privacy Statement for the Microsoft
Error Reporting Service
Software License Terms—Office
2010 Desktop Application Software
Genuine Microsoft Software
Program Privacy Statement
Privacy Statement for Office 2010
Use of Microsoft Copyrighted
Content
Privacy Supplement for Office
Starter
Trademark Guidelines
Service Agreement
Online Privacy Statement
Anti-Spam Policy
Authorized 3rd Party Software and
Services
Microsoft Subtotal:
Software License Agreement

When
Encountered?

1,822

Computer startup

1,822

1 contract

5,115

Computer startup

784
14,872

Incorporated in 2
Incorporated in 2

429

Incorporated in 2

1,306

Incorporated in 4

2,819

Office Starter
startup

911

Incorporated in 7

4,994

Incorporated in 7
Incorporated in 7
and 13

1,628
455

Incorporated in 9

47
10,444
4,614
464

Incorporated in 10
Incorporated in 10
Incorporated in 13
Incorporated in 13

130

Incorporated in 13

49,012

15 contracts

4,551
201
8,130
1,300
3,001

Premiere Elements
startup
Incorporated in 17
Incorporated in 18
Incorporated in 17
Incorporated in 20
Incorporated in 22

1,484

Incorporated in 22

101

Incorporated in 17

521

Incorporated in 17

9,217

Privacy Policy
Adobe.com Opt-Out page
General Terms of Use
Trademark Information
Trademark Guidelines
Trademark Database for General
Distribution
Fonts
Flash Runtime Distribution
License
Adobe Subtotal:

28,506

9 contracts

HP PURCHASE TOTAL

79,340

25 contracts
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Toshiba

TOSHIBA PURCHASE
Contract
No.
1
2

Title
Terms and Conditions of Sale
NAF Code of Procedure

3

Notices

4
5
6
7

Limited Warranty
JAMS Streamlined Arbitration
Rules & Procedures
End User License Agreement
Eco Utility
Toshiba Subtotal:

2,522
7,282

5,115

Computer startup

784
14,872

Incorporated in 8
Incorporated in 8

429

Incorporated in 8

1,306

Incorporated in 10

2,819

Office Starter
startup

Service Agreement

10,444

20
21

Online Privacy Statement
Anti-Spam Policy
Authorized 3rd Party Software and
Services
Microsoft Subtotal:

12
13
14
15
16
17

22

23
24
25

Chrome Terms of Service
Google Privacy Policy
Key Terms

26

Google Chrome Privacy Notice
Google Subtotal:

Incorporated in 4
Computer startup
Eco Utility Startup
7 contracts

19

11

When
Encountered?
At purchase
Incorporated in 1
Shrinkwrap on
computer
Incorporated in 3

2,029
847
31,763

18

9
10

Microsoft

405

License Terms, Windows 7 Home
Premium
Windows 7 Privacy Statement
Windows 7 Privacy Supplement
.NET Framework Benchmark
Testing Terms
Privacy Statement for the Microsoft
Error Reporting Service
Software License Terms—Office
2010 Desktop Application Software
Genuine Microsoft Software
Program Privacy Statement
Privacy Statement for Office 2010
Use of Microsoft Copyrighted
Content
Privacy Supplement for Office
Starter
Trademark Guidelines

8

Google

Word
Count
2,175
16,503

911

Incorporated in 13

4,994

Incorporated in 13
Incorporated in 13
and 19

1,628
455

Incorporated in 15

47

4,614
464

Incorporated in 16
Incorporated in 16;
Live Essentials
startup
Incorporated in 19
Incorporated in 19

130

Incorporated in 19

49,012

15 contracts

6,552
2,240
598

Chrome startup
Incorporated in 26
Incorporated in 27

3,225

Incorporated in 26

12,615

4 contracts

[Toshiba Purchase continued on next page]
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Norton

TOSHIBA PURCHASE
Contract
No.

Title

27

Norton License Agreement

Word
Count

When
Encountered?

3,251

Internet Security
startup

Norton Subtotal:

3,251

1 contract

TOSHIBA PURCHASE TOTAL

96,641

27 contracts

